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ABSTRACT 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Association (“FINRA”) maintains 
a database of customer complaints regarding individuals licensed by 
FINRA as registered representatives.  Both securities regulators and 
the investing public can access and use the data to find out about 
past customer complaints of the registered representatives.  
However, records of customer complaints can be expunged from the 
database through an arbitration process that FINRA created. 
This Article traces the history of that arbitration process and focuses 
on how it is employed in cases where the investor was paid money to 
settle a claim.  The Article studies FINRA arbitrations in such cases 
and reveals that customer complaints regarding claims that later 
settled are being expunged at the rate of 93.7%, often in perfunctory 
ex parte proceedings where the complainant has agreed to not 
oppose the application as part of the settlement.  This Article 
concludes with a proposal for necessary changes to the expungement 
process in order for the FINRA database to maintain its integrity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) maintains 
the Central Registration Depository (“CRD”), a database of information 
about individuals registered as representatives of securities brokerage 
firms.1  The CRD profile of a registered representative contains 
information about, inter alia, un-adjudicated complaints and pending 
arbitrations brought by investor-customers.2  CRD is important because 
of its potential value to regulators, prospective employers of the 
individual, and the investing public in overseeing, hiring, or choosing 
registered representatives.3  “BrokerCheck,” the online system that 
makes this information publicly available, draws its data from CRD.4 
The reporting and public availability of un-adjudicated customer 
complaints affects the reputation of registered representatives, and that 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Central Registration Depository (CRD), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
Industry/Compliance/Registration/CRD/index.htm (last visited June 16, 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 01-65: NASD SEEKS COMMENT ON 
PROPOSED RULES AND POLICIES RELATING TO EXPUNGEMENT OF INFORMATION FROM 
THE CENTRAL REGISTRATION DEPOSITORY, at 564 (2001), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003
745.pdf [hereinafter NASD, NTM 01-65]. 
 4. See BrokerCheck – Search, FINRA, http://brokercheck.finra.org/Search/ 
Search.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2013); About BrokerCheck Reports, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/ (last visited Nov. 1, 
2013). 
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causes concern among industry participants.5  Industry participants 
oppose the disclosure and public availability of un-adjudicated 
complaints, asserting that unproven information could damage 
reputations.6  FINRA, however, has not shown any inclination to 
eliminate such reporting.7 
FINRA does, however, offer a process by which any broker whose 
CRD profile is affected by a customer complaint may apply to a FINRA 
arbitration panel to expunge that information from the database.8  This 
arbitration process creates little controversy when the investor’s claim is 
dismissed after a merits-based hearing in which both the complainant 
and the broker appear.9  In those cases, the arbitrators who heard the 
evidence are well positioned to decide whether the record should be 
expunged, e.g., by concluding that the expungement request has merit.10 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Dan Jamieson, In re, BrokerCheck:  SIFMA Urges FINRA to Expand In Re 
Expungement, INVESTMENT NEWS (May 25, 2012, 3:04 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120525/FREE/120529939#. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See, e.g., SIFMA Comment to FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-18 (FINRA 
Requests Comment on Proposed New In re Expungement Procedures for Persons Not 
Named in a Customer-Initiated Arbitration), http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation 
/Notices/2012/P125948 (last visited June 16, 2013) [hereinafter SIFMA, COMMENT 
LETTER] (“Throughout the development of these disclosure requirements, and while 
recognizing the positive goal of promoting informed investor decision-making, SIFMA 
has cautioned against disclosure requirements that do not advance the goal of providing 
relevant information and, worse, risk the dissemination of unfounded negative 
information that can have an adverse impact on a registered person’s business and 
reputation.”). 
 8. See Expungement, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/ 
arbitration/specialprocedures/expungement/ (last visited June 16, 2013). 
 9. See Florence Harmon, Letter of FINRA to SEC, at 2 n.8 (Sept. 3, 2008) 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p03
9154.pdf; Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of 
Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow when 
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra 
/2008/34-58886.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013); C. Thomas Mason III, Letter to SEC, 
Mar. 31, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd2002168/ctmason033103.htm (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2013); C. Thomas Mason III, CRD Expungement:  Laws, Proposed 
NASD Rules and Lawyer Ethics, 9 PIABA B.J. 77 (2002). 
 10. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 2080(b) (2013), Obtaining an Order of 
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the Central Registration 
Depository (CRD) System; Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded 
Expungement Guidance, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/ 
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However, controversy surrounds the expungement process for CRD 
records of cases that settle for money before any arbitration hearing is 
held.11  Such situations present a danger that expungements are 
“purchased” in cases where a complaining investor is paid a substantial 
sum of money in exchange for a “Stipulated Award” of expungement or 
for an agreement to not oppose the registered representative’s 
expungement request.12  Such paid agreements increase the likelihood 
                                                                                                                 
SpecialProcedures/Expungement/index.htm (“In making these determinations, 
arbitrators should consider the importance of maintaining the integrity of the 
information in the CRD system.”). 
 11. See Susan Antilla, A Rise in Requests From Brokers to Wipe the Slate Clean, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/a-rise-in-requests-
from-brokers-to-wipe-the-slate-clean/?_r=0; Suzanne Barlyn, Wall Street Watchdog to 
Review Tactic for Cleaning Broker Records, REUTERS, Aug. 2, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-finra-expungement-
idUSBRE9710WA20130802; Dan Jamieson, Record-Cleaning Rules for Registered 
Reps to Get FINRA Tweak, INVESTMENT NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013, 3:40 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130806/FREE/130809952; Dan Jamieson, 
New FINRA Rules Could Help Brokers Clear Records in Certain Cases, INVESTMENT 
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:57 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130808/ 
FREE/130809919; Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Stockbroker Requests to Scrub 
Complaints Are Often Granted, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2013, at C1; see also Lynnley 
Browning, Site That Tracks Brokers Questioned on Erased Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/14/business/ 
14regulate.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin; Karen Donovan, The Expungement 
Campaign, REGISTERED REP MAG., Nov. 1, 2007, http://wealthmanagement.com/ 
practice-management/expungement-crusade; Howard R. Elisofon & Grant R. Cornehls, 
The Road to Expungement Grows Longer, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 2010, at 1. 
 12. See Antilla, supra note 12 (“Critics of FINRA policies also say many brokers 
are simply purchasing a clean record by offering substantial money in return for the 
customer’s agreement not to oppose an expungement request.”); see also Barlyn, supra 
note 12. 
  After the research in this Article was first presented on October 14, 2013, 
FINRA emailed a Notice to its arbitrators expressing this concern: 
Asking Whether Settlements Are Conditioned on Agreements Not to 
Oppose Expungement 
Arbitrators should inquire and fully consider whether a party 
conditioned a settlement of the arbitration upon agreement not to 
oppose the request for expungement in cases in which the investor 
does not participate in the expungement hearing or the requesting 
party states that an investor has indicated that he or she will not 
oppose the expungement request. 
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that this highly valuable customer complaint information is erased from 
the public record.13 
Since 1999, FINRA has tried to define standards and impose 
procedural safeguards to prevent unwarranted or inappropriate 
expungements at the arbitration level.14  In addition, FINRA requires 
registered representatives seeking expungement to obtain a court’s 
confirmation of any expungement award and to give FINRA notice of 
that judicial proceeding in order to give FINRA (or a state securities 
regulator) the opportunity to oppose it.15 
This Article demonstrates that the safeguards and procedures that 
FINRA created do not work as intended.  Expungements, which FINRA 
repeatedly describes in its Notices to Members (“Notices” or “NTMs”)16 
and rule filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”)17 as an “extraordinary remedy,”18 are being granted in settled 
cases at a rate of 93.7%.19  Expungement applications are made in over 
one-fifth of all settled cases.20  This Article, with a focus on the ex parte 
nature of post-settlement expungement proceedings, analyzes the 
reasons for the discrepancy between these expungement trends and the 
stated purpose of expungement according to FINRA and the SEC.21   
This Article also shows that the supposed safeguards of notice to 
regulators and judicial confirmation of expungement awards have failed 
to serve their purposes.22 
                                                                                                                 
Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement Guidance, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/arbitration/specialprocedures/expungeme
nt/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 13. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3. 
 14. See generally infra Parts I.B & II.A. 
 15. Id. 
 16. “FINRA publishes Notices to provide firms with timely information on a 
variety of issues.” 2013 Notices, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/ 
Notices/2013/index.htm. 
 17. The SEC regulates the securities industry and FINRA. See The Investor’s 
Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#laws, 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2013); What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ 
WhatWeDo/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 18. See sources cited infra note 123. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See infra Parts IV-V. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
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Part I introduces the CRD system and the background of the 
expungement controversy.23  It then traces FINRA’s attempts to address 
these expungement issues, from its 1999 moratorium on arbitrator-
initiated expungements of customer complaints through a series of 
FINRA Notices that led to FINRA’s adoption in 2003 of Rule 2080,24 
which empowers arbitrators to grant expungements.25  Although that 
Rule was supposed to limit the circumstances in which arbitrators could 
grant expungement,26 it appears to do little more than enable a rubber-
stamping process.27 
By late 2007, it was clear that the definitions and safeguards that 
FINRA created in 2003 were not working.28  Part II details and analyzes 
a series of cases that show that some state regulators were concerned 
about many arbitrators rubber-stamping expungement requests.29  Those 
decisions also show that once arbitrators enter an award of 
expungement, the regulators had little, if any, power to stop the 
expungement of CRD information.30 
As a result, in 2008, FINRA adopted Rule 12805, also purportedly 
designed to limit the expungements agreed upon in settlement 
agreements and to preserve the regulatory and informational value of 
CRD.31  Part III examines this Rule, which requires arbitrators to hold 
hearings regarding the possibility of expungement32 and to consider the 
settlement amount.33  To grant expungement, the arbitrator must find 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. The Rule was titled NASD 2130 when adopted but was renumbered in 2009 as 
FINRA Rule 2080. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-33, SEC APPROVAL AND 
EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NEW CONSOLIDATED FINRA RULES (2009), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p118
967.pdf. 
 25. See infra Part I.B. 
 26. See NASD, NTM 04-16, infra note 119; see also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part II.B. 
 31. See infra Part III.A. 
 32. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(a) (2013), Expungement of Customer 
Dispute Information under Rule 2080, available at http://finra.complinet.com/ 
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=7229 (last visited June 16, 
2013) [hereinafter FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(a)]. 
 33. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(b) (2013), Expungement of Customer 
Dispute Information under Rule 2080, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
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that the complaint was erroneous or false or that the representative was 
not involved in a sales practice violation,34 and the arbitrator must 
provide a “brief written explanation” for such finding.35  Part III also 
addresses the 2009 change that increased the incidence of reporting 
customer complaints. 
In order to learn whether the 2008 changes have made any 
difference, Part IV of this Article studies and analyzes all of the post-
settlement arbitration awards rendered in the first half of 2013.36  The 
study shows that even with the Rules and their supposed safeguards, 
arbitrators still grant expungement in virtually every settled case in 
which expungement is requested.37  No one opposed the expungement 
application in all but three of the 205 cases studied, and each of those 
three cases resulted in a denial of expungement.38  In all of the other 
cases, the arbitrators heard only the registered representative protest 
innocence, and they saw only the evidence that the representative 
wanted the arbitrators to see.39  Almost two-thirds of the hearings 
                                                                                                                 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=7229 (last visited June 16, 2013) 
[hereinafter FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(b)]. 
 34. According to FINRA, the term “involved” (within the meaning of “involved in 
a sales practice violation”) “includes both doing an act and failing reasonably to 
supervise another in doing an act.” FINRA FAQ “Form U4 and U5 Interpretive 
Questions and Answers,” at 7, revised Jan. 2, 2013, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportd
ocs/p119944.pdf.  The term “sales practice violation” is defined to include “any 
conduct directed at or involving a customer which would constitute a violation of any 
rules for which a person could be disciplined by any self-regulatory organization; any 
provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or any state statute prohibiting 
fraudulent conduct in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security or in 
connection with the rendering of investment advice.” Id. at 9; see also Form U4 
Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer, revised May 
2009, at 11, available athttp://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/ 
documents/appsupportdocs/p015111.pdf. 
 35. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(c) (2013), Expungement of Customer 
Dispute Information Under Rule 2080, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=7229 (last visited June 16, 2013) 
[hereinafter FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(c)]. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
 37. See SETH LIPNER, ANALYSIS OF EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS IN SETTLED FINRA 
CUSTOMER ARBITRATIONS JANUARY 1, 2013 - JUNE 30, 2013 (2013), available at 
http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/lipner/expungement.pdf [hereinafter LIPNER, 
ANALYSIS OF EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS FOR FIRST HALF OF 2013]. 
 38. See infra note 233 and accompanying text; infra Part IV and accompanying 
notes. 
 39. Id. 
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resulting in expungement were conducted by telephone.40  The study 
also shows that only twelve of these 205 telephone “hearings” took 
more than three and a half hours.41 
Finally, Part V.A analyzes the problems associated with the current 
expungement process, demonstrating how and why the system has failed 
to achieve its goals.  Part V.B then proposes an alternative system that, 
if adopted, would provide for appropriate notice and regulatory review 
of expungement applications, as well as end the ex parte arbitration 
hearings that ineffectively safeguard the CRD system. 
I.  CRD BASICS AND THE EXPUNGEMENT CONTROVERSY 
A.  CRD BASICS 
Securities broker-dealers and their sales representatives are subject 
to a multitude of regulations at both the federal and state levels.42  The 
federal responsibility is delegated by the SEC to FINRA, a self-
regulatory organization.43  In its role as a regulator, FINRA sets 
licensing requirements, administers licensing examinations, establishes 
and enforces regulations concerning the conduct of licensed entities and 
persons, and maintains an Enforcement Division to discipline 
violators.44 
State regulatory jurisdiction overlaps that of FINRA.  Each state 
has its own licensing requirements, investigative and enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; see also Wexco Indus. v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-01063, 2013 WL 
653343 (FINRA Feb. 11, 2013); infra note 283 (regarding Barker and the expungement 
of twenty-two brokers’ CRD records after a telephonic hearing of three and a half 
hours). 
 42. Section 15(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) 
requires brokers and dealers to register with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2012).  
Although many state securities laws do not cover broker-dealer regulation in depth, 
most states at the minimum require state registration or notification of federal 
registration as a broker-dealer. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION § 8.1 (2013).  Additionally, state securities law, generally 
prohibit fraud in connection with securities transactions. Id. 
 43. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange:  
Reconciling Self-Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 
1075–76 (2005). 
 44. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
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divisions, and adjudicatory mechanisms.45  The state regulators 
coordinate their policies and activities through the North American 
Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”).46 
In 1981, FINRA, then known as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”),47 together with the states, created the 
CRD electronic database.48  CRD contains a host of information about 
both brokerage firms (“firms”) and their registered representatives 
(“brokers”).49  Each firm and broker has a unique identifier (a “CRD 
number”), and information concerning each is catalogued separately.50  
While FINRA and NASAA share ownership of CRD and 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See generally Joseph C. Long, 12A Blue Sky Law §1:41 (2010). 
 46. See Our Role, N. AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N, available at http://www.nasaa.org/ 
about-us/our-role/http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/our-role/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 47. FINRA combined the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the 
“NASD”) and the member regulatory functions of NYSE Group, Inc. (“NYSE”). See 
Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be 
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 151–52 (2008). 
 48. See CRD & IARD, N. AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N, available at 
http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/investment-advisers/crd-iard/ (last visited Jan. 
25, 2013).  FINRA is the entity that currently operates the Web CRD system. See 
Central Registration Depository (CRD), FINRA, available at 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/CRD/index.htm (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2013). 
 49. The CRD system contains the registration records of more than 6,800 
registered broker-dealers.  The system also contains more than 660,000 active 
registered individuals’ qualification (e.g. licenses and certifications), employment, and 
disclosure histories. See Central Registration Depository (CRD), FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/CRD/index.htm (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2013). 
 50. A CRD number is a unique number assigned to an individual or firm as part of 
the financial services industry registration process. See FINRA BrokerCheck – Search, 
FINRA, http://brokercheck.finra.org/Search/Search.aspx (last visited June 16, 2013).  
Much of information for the CRD system is submitted by registered broker-dealers as 
part of the firms’ reporting function.  There are six types of Uniform Registration 
Forms used to file information with the Web CRD system.  The relevant forms for the 
purposes of this Article are: (1) Form U4 and Form U5, (2) Form BD and Form BDW, 
and (3) Form U6.  Broker-dealers use the U4 and U5 for the registration and 
termination of associated persons with SROs and jurisdictions.  Broker-dealer firms use 
the Forms BD and BDW to register or terminate registration with the SEC, an SRO, and 
jurisdictions.  Finally, SROs, regulators, and jurisdictions use the Form U6 to report 
disciplinary actions against broker-dealer firms and associated persons and to report 
arbitration awards. See Current Uniform Registration Forms for Electronic Filing in 
Web CRD, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/CRD/ 
FilingGuidance/p005235 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
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“BrokerCheck,” FINRA administers both databases.51  However, both 
sets of regulators, along with the public, have a clear interest in the 
integrity of CRD information.52 
The availability of CRD allows many individuals and organizations 
to access the information.  FINRA, state regulators, and the SEC can 
access and use the information to fulfill their regulatory functions.53  
Prospective employers of brokers can view and use the information as 
part of their pre-hiring due diligence.54  Lastly, investors can access a 
subset of CRD information about brokers through BrokerCheck, 
FINRA’s searchable online database.55 
The record of customer complaints on a broker’s CRD is called 
“customer dispute information.”56  Customer dispute information 
includes: (a) written complaints, (b) arbitrations that name the broker as 
a party, (c) litigation that names the broker as a party, and (d) arbitration 
awards and civil judgments.57  In addition, since 2009, arbitrations and 
litigations in which the broker is not named as a party must be reported 
on CRD if the pleading alleges that the broker was involved in a sales 
practice violation.58 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Exam FAQs, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASSOC., http://www.nasaa.org/industry-
resources/exams/exam-faqs/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (noting that FINRA maintains 
the CRD). 
 52. See infra Part II. 
 53. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3, at 564. 
 54. See id. at 567. 
 55. The NASD renamed the “Public Disclosure Program” as “BrokerCheck” in 
2003. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 03-76: NASD SEEKS COMMENT ON ENHANCED 
ACCESS TO NASD BROKERCHECK (FORMERLY KNOWN AS NASD’S PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 
PROGRAM) (2003), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/ 
@notice/documents/notices/p003055.pdf.  Public investors do not have access to the 
CRD system, but the CRD’s information is available to investors via BrokerCheck. 
 56. See supra note 24; see also NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 04-16:  NASD 
ADOPTS RULE 2130 REGARDING EXPUNGEMENT OF CUSTOMER DISPUTE INFORMATION 
FROM THE CENTRAL REGISTRATION DEPOSITORY (2004), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003
235.pdf [hereinafter NASD, NTM 04-16]. 
 57. See FINRA Rule 2080 (Formerly NASD Rule 2130) Frequently Asked 
Questions, FINRA http://www.finra.org/industry/compliance/registration/crd/ 
filingguidance/p005224 (last updated Aug. 17, 2009). 
 58. See Expungement, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/ 
arbitration/specialprocedures/expungement/ (last visited June 16, 2013).  Brokerage 
firms must submit a disclosure report about a broker even if the broker is not a named 
party to the arbitration or lawsuit. See id.  A report is required merely when a broker is 
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The availability and value of this information conflicts with the 
interests of many in the brokerage industry.  Brokers often argue that 
even a single publicly available record of a complaint can damage their 
business prospects.59  Brokers are particularly concerned about 
information of un-adjudicated complaints on their CRD records, but 
FINRA continues to include that information in CRD and the publicly 
available BrokerCheck.60  As a result, brokers want a method for 
seeking the expungement of customer dispute information from CRD.61  
However, FINRA, the state regulators, and the investing public have an 
interest in assuring that CRD information is complete and fighting to 
make expungement harder to obtain.62  The stakes are high:  information 
expunged from the CRD disappears from the view of all, including 
regulators, potential employers, and investors.63 
FINRA’s solution to these competing interests is to use FINRA’s 
arbitration process to adjudicate expungement requests.64  From 1981 to 
                                                                                                                 
the “subject of” sales practice violation allegations in arbitration claims or civil 
lawsuits. See id. 
 59. See Jamieson, supra note 5.  The 2009 change in reporting is discussed in Part 
III.B of this Article. See infra Part III.B. 
 60. See supra notes 5, 8 and accompanying text. 
 61. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-09:  NASD REGULATION IMPOSES 
MORATORIUM ON ARBITRATOR-ORDERED EXPUNGEMENTS OF INFORMATION FROM THE 
CENTRAL REGISTRATION DEPOSITORY (1999), available at http://www.finra.org/web/ 
groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p004582.pdf [hereinafter 
NASD, NTM 99-09] (announcing a moratorium on the expungement of certain 
information, unless confirmed by a court, only six years after the beginning of the 
NASD’s Public Disclosure Program (CRD) based on the frequency of arbitrator 
awarded expungements); see also Letter from Kevin M. Carroll, Managing Dir. and 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to Marcia E. Asquith, Office of the Corporate Sec’y, 
FINRA (May 21, 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/ 
Notices/2012/P125948 (last visited June 16, 2013). 
 62. While adopting Rule 2080 regarding expungement, the NASD outlined the 
need for balancing three competing interests: (1) the interests of regulators and states in 
retaining access to customer dispute information for the purpose of meeting regulatory 
requirements and investor protection needs; (2) the interests of the brokerage 
community; and (3) the interests of investors in having access to complete and accurate 
information about financial professional with whom they conduct, or may conduct, 
business. See NASD, NTM 04-16, supra note 56. 
 63. By seeking “expungement,” a broker seeks to have a reference to allegations or 
to involvement in an arbitration entirely removed from his or her CRD System record. 
See Expungement, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/arbitration/ 
specialprocedures/expungement/ (last visited June 16, 2013). 
 64. The principal function of FINRA’s arbitration division is to administer and 
conduct arbitrations of disputes between customers and securities industry members, 
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1999, FINRA’s policy was to erase customer dispute information from 
CRD if there were either a judgment or an arbitration award directing 
expungement.65  There were no standards in place, no requirements that 
arbitrators had to follow before ordering expungement, and no 
regulatory or judicial review of expungement orders from arbitrators.66 
B.  THE EXPUNGEMENT MORATORIUM AND FINRA’S ADOPTION OF RULE 
2080 
In 1999, FINRA imposed a moratorium on arbitrator awards of 
expungement.67  The expungement moratorium was a temporary means 
to resolve a clash that began in August 1998 between FINRA and state 
regulators regarding expungement awards.68  Florida’s Securities 
Commissioner wrote a letter to FINRA questioning the legality of 
arbitrator-directed expungements.69  In January 1999, NASAA 
supported the Florida regulator and informed FINRA that, under the 
laws of certain states, information filed with the CRD system is a “state 
record,” thereby subjecting CRD to all of the regulations and protocols 
that apply to state records, including provisions on expungement.70  
NASAA also asked FINRA to cease honoring arbitrator-directed 
expungements, opining that the laws of some states do not recognize the 
                                                                                                                 
between securities industry members (i.e., firms), and between firms and their 
employees, including brokers.  Since the 1987 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Shearson v. McMahon that held agreements to arbitrate broker-customer disputes as 
binding, nearly all disputes between brokerage firms and their customers have been 
resolved in arbitration. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 
(1987) (holding that arbitration is a just and efficient method of resolving securities 
claims under the Exchange Act); see also About the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 65. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See NASD, NTM 99-09, supra note 61. 
 68. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-54:  NASD REGULATION SEEKS COMMENT 
ON ISSUES RELATING TO ARBITRATOR ORDERED EXPUNGEMENTS OF INFORMATION 
FROM THE CENTRAL REGISTRATION DEPOSITORY (1999), at 351–54, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p004
219.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter NASD, NTM 99-54] (citing Advisory 
Legal Opinion issued by Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney Gen. of the State of Fla., 
AGO 98-54 (Aug. 28, 1998)) (regarding records obtained from the securities dealer 
association’s central depository). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See NASD, NTM 99-09, supra note 61. 
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authority of an arbitrator to expunge state records.71  The agreement 
between NASAA and FINRA that created the CRD system expressly 
authorizes FINRA to honor judicially directed expungements but was 
silent as to arbitrator-directed expungements.72  In February 1999, 
FINRA acceded to NASAA’s views and announced a moratorium on 
arbitrator-awarded expungement of customer dispute information.73 
Then, in July 1999, FINRA issued NTM 99-54 in order to provide 
its views on expungements awarded by arbitrators and to seek comments 
on how to proceed,74 acknowledging that it had never developed a clear 
policy on how its arbitrators should decide expungement applications.75 
Notice 99-54 explains several of FINRA’s goals.  First, FINRA believed 
that the expungement of information from the CRD system that is 
directed by an arbitrator and contained in an arbitration award should be 
afforded the same treatment as a court-ordered expungement.76  Second, 
the implementation of that policy should “comply[] with any applicable 
state record-keeping laws and maintain[] the integrity of the CRD 
system” because CRD had “important investor protection 
implications.”77  Accordingly, the information in the system should be 
“complete and accurate,” and customer dispute information “should not 
be expunged without good reason.”78 
NTM 99-54 also raised another important issue:  whether “consent 
awards,” e.g., awards that memorialize a settlement of the investor’s 
complaint and contain an agreement to expunge CRD information 
should be treated differently from awards rendered after a contested 
proceeding.79  The concern over consent awards (which FINRA will 
later call “Stipulated Awards”)80 was well founded, as arbitrators were 
issuing consent awards based exclusively on the parties’ (joint) 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See NASD, NTM 99-54, supra note 68. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 352. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3, at 567 (defining consent awards as 
“Stipulated Awards,” which are of particular concern because of the lack of fact-finders 
or formal hearings inherent in the settlement process). 
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request.81  Furthermore, significant amounts of money were paid to 
complainants in settlements that included an agreed expungement.82 
 The Notice describes FINRA’s objective—”ensur[ing] that 
investor protection is not compromised” by paid-for expungements.83  
FINRA’s approach to the problem was to set appropriately high 
standards so that expungements are not granted in questionable 
circumstances.84  High standards “would enhance the integrity of the 
CRD system” while still providing a mechanism to remove misleading, 
inaccurate, or erroneous information from CRD.85  FINRA offered 
examples of circumstances in which expungement would be warranted, 
such as a customer complaint that was frivolous or groundless (i.e., the 
claim had no basis in fact) or brought for an improper purpose (i.e., to 
damage the reputation of the named person/firm).86 
In 2001, FINRA issued another Notice about expungements, NTM 
01-65.87  The main purpose of Notice 01-65 was to vet FINRA’s new 
ideas about how to balance a broker’s reputational concerns against the 
regulatory and public interests identified in the 1999 Notices.88  This 
Notice describes the comments submitted to FINRA after NTM 99-54 as 
“mixed.”89  Industry-affiliated commenters generally favored arbitrator-
awarded expungements90 while most non-industry opposed them.91  In 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See NASD, NTM 99-54, supra note 68, at 352. 
 82. Id.  FINRA offered several approaches to the problem of settled cases.  One 
approach was to retain the complaint information on the CRD system but delete it from 
BrokerCheck. See id. at 353.  Another approach was to maintain the information in both 
places but add a legend that the complaint had been ordered expunged by an arbitrator 
or a panel of arbitrators. Id.  A third approach was to establish standards for arbitrator-
ordered expungements resulting from consent awards. Id.  A fourth approach, similar to 
the first, was to delete the information from CRD and Broker-Check after first sending 
a record to each state through an alternative medium, such as hard copy or microfilm. 
See id. 
 83. See NASD, NTM 99-54, supra note 68, at 353. 
 84. See id. at 352. 
 85. Id. at 353. 
 86. See id. at 354. 
 87. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 565. 
 90. See id.; see also Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell, Senior Vice President and Gen. 
Counsel of Sec. Indus. Assoc., to Joan C. Conley, NASD Secretary (July 30, 1999), 
available at www.sifma.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=1365 (commenting that 
SIA believes there is no basis to change the pre-moratorium system). 
 91. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3, at 565. 
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NTM 01-65, FINRA, for the first time, cited the concern for damaged 
reputations as a factor in formulating expungement policy.92  FINRA 
reiterated that it wanted to promote an arbitrator-expungement process.93 
NTM 01-65 states that the creation of high standards must be part 
of the solution94 because expungement is an “extraordinary” remedy.95  
The Notice explains that FINRA would permit expungement in any case 
where a fact-finder—an arbitration panel or court—had conducted an 
adversarial hearing and concluded that the case fell into one of the three 
enumerated categories: (1) “factual impossibility or ‘clear error’”; (2) a 
legally meritless claim; or (3) the CRD information “is determined to be 
defamatory.”96  NTM 01-65 sought comments as to whether these three 
categories were the appropriate ones.97 
The Notice then turns to the problem of Stipulated Awards, again 
characterizing expungement relief as extraordinary.98  Just as in 1999, 
FINRA expressed concerns that a firm may pay a customer who filed a 
claim to settle on the condition that the customer agrees to the 
expungement of all of the information about the claim from the broker’s 
CRD.99  FINRA stated its awareness of “allegations that firms have 
pressed customer/claimants into accepting expungement as a condition 
of settlement of arbitration proceedings.”100  FINRA conceded that 
despite the fact that arbitrators are not required to sign awards with 
which they disagree, many arbitrators were executing Stipulated Awards 
without inquiry.101  FINRA acknowledged that settling parties do not 
share the interests of regulators and the investing public about the 
accuracy and completeness of CRD.102 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. NASD Notice to Members 99-09 and NASD Notice to Members 99-54 
made no express reference to reputational damage. See generally NASD, NTM 99-09, 
supra note 61; NASD, NTM 99-54, supra note 68, at 351–54. 
 94. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3, at 565. 
 95. Id. 
 96. FINRA offers cases where the person named in the complaint was “named in 
error” as example of cases that fall into this category. Id. 
 97. Id.  FINRA stated that the fact that the party seeking expungement had 
prevailed was not itself conclusive, because expungement was extraordinary relief. Id.  
FINRA also said that expungement should never be granted when the award was 
adverse to the party seeking expungement of the issue. Id. at 566. 
 98. See id. at 563. 
 99. See id. at 567. 
 100. See id. at 570. 
 101. See id. at 567. 
 102. See id. at 565. 
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However, FINRA also stated that it did not want expungement 
issues to discourage settlements.103  FINRA argued that it could strike an 
appropriate balance by limiting expungement in settled cases to cases of 
“factual impossibility” or “clear error.”104  The Notice stated that FINRA 
was not proposing to include the other two bases (viz. “without legal 
merit” or “defamatory”) as grounds for expungement in settled cases for 
two reasons.  First, “it is unlikely that [the investor’s] counsel would 
agree to such findings as part of a settlement,” and second, because the 
case was settled, no fact finder would be in a position to determine that 
the claim was “without legal merit” or was “defamatory.”105 
FINRA also explained in NTM 01-65 that it would still require: (1) 
judicial confirmation of all arbitration awards granting expungement, 
and (2) that FINRA receive notice of all applications for judicial orders 
of expungement.106  FINRA promised that it would review all such 
applications—to ensure that the cases meet the criteria described in the 
Notice—and advise the courts of its conclusion.107  FINRA also 
promised to notify state regulators every time it received notice of an 
application for a judicial order of expungement so that “one or more 
states may . . . intervene in the . . . proceeding.”108  The Notice said 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 565 (“NASD Regulation also has been concerned about crafting an 
approach that does not have an overly broad chilling effect on the settlement process . . 
. .”). 
 104. Id. at 563.  These categories, according to FINRA, were exemplified by 
situations where the person named in a complaint did not work at the firm at the time of 
the complaint. “[S]uch persons,” FINRA reasoned, “should be able to avail themselves 
of the settlement opportunity,” and then request expungement. Id. at 567. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. The requirement would include both applications to confirm awards of 
expungement and applications of settlements of cases outside of the arbitration process 
that are then submitted for court approval. See id. 
 107. See id. at 567. 
 108. Id. In NTM 01-65, FINRA should have known that it was wading into a deep 
thicket. See id.; NASD, NTM 99-09, supra note 61; NASD, NTM 99-54, supra note 68.  
The Notice contained a form, with boxes to check, indicating the commenter’s answer 
to specific questions. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3, at 571.  FINRA received 
579 responses to NTM 01-65. See NASD, PROPOSED RULE 2130 GOVERNING 
EXPUNGEMENT OF CUSTOMER DISPUTE INFORMATION FROM THE CENTRAL 
REGISTRATION DEPOSITORY (CRD SYSTEM) (2002), at 10, attached to Letter from 
Barbara Z. Sweeney, Senior Vice President and Corp. Secretary, NASD, to Katherine 
A. England, Assistant Dir., SEC. (Nov. 18, 2002), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p00
1015.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter NASD, PROPOSED RULE 2130].  Of the 
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nothing about the standards that FINRA would apply in the promised 
review, nor did it say what FINRA would or could do in the event the 
review showed that the expungement was not justified.109 
On November 19, 2002, FINRA proposed the new expungement 
Rule 2130.110  The proposed Rule was similar to the approach described 
in NTM 01-65, but there was a very important difference when it came 
to settled cases.  Under the proposed Rule, Stipulated Awards would be 
treated the same as awards following an adversarial hearing; there would 
be no difference between adjudicated cases and settled cases.111  A case 
falling into any of the three broad, somewhat re-worked categories 
justified an arbitration award of expungement.112 
                                                                                                                 
579 responses, 539 were responses on the check-the-boxes form. See id. at 10.  The vast 
majority of these were sent from brokers (mostly from one firm), all indicating that 
expungements—whether after a hearing or as a result of settlement—should be 
unregulated and recognized without condition. Id.  The forty written comments were 
predictably mixed—industry participants were opposed to any regulation, or were 
reluctantly amenable, so long as the bases were adjusted and expanded. Id. at 12–15.  
The investor advocates who wrote were mostly opposed to all arbitrator-directed 
expungements, indeed to any expungement. See id.  The investor advocates questioned 
whether FINRA arbitrators could be relied upon to make appropriate findings and 
whether FINRA enforcement would truly serve the public interest at the confirmation 
stage. See id.  They noted that arbitration award confirmation rarely involved 
meaningful judicial scrutiny, especially when the requested relief was unopposed. See 
id. 
 109. NASD, PROPOSED RULE 2130, supra note 108, at 1. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. at 4–5. See generally Order Granting Approval of NASD Proposed Rule 
Change Concerning the Expungement of Customer Dispute Information From the 
Central Registration Depository System, 68 Fed. Reg. 74667 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
 112. See NASD, PROPOSED RULE 2130, supra note 108, at 4–5.  The three bases, 
however, were reworked from the 2001 Notice.  The first—the “factually 
impossible/clear error” category—was changed to “without factual basis”; the second—
”without legal merit”—was changed to “the complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted or is frivolous”; while the third category—that the information on 
the CRD system was “defamatory in nature”—was unchanged from the 2001 NTM. 
Compare NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3, with Proposed Rule 2130 Governing 
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information From the Central Registration 
Depository (CRD System), FINRA (2002), http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/ 
RuleFilings/2002/P001160. 
  In September 2003, as the rule proposal proceeded toward SEC approval, 
FINRA offered an amendment that proposed yet more modifications to its enumeration 
of the three bases. See Letter from Shirley H. Weiss, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NASD, to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p00
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FINRA gave no explanation for why it expanded the available 
bases for waiving the requirement to name FINRA as a party in post-
settlement awards.  The concerns about purchased expungements had 
apparently disappeared from FINRA’s view.113  In the Rule filing, 
FINRA simply explained that its purpose was to validate arbitrator 
expungements.114  Still, FINRA continued to tell the SEC that 
expungement should only be granted in circumstances that were 
extraordinary,115 but by declining to limit expungement to the “clearly 
                                                                                                                 
1019.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (discussing Amendment No. 2 to Proposed NASD 
Rule 2130 Governing Expungement of Customer Dispute Information From the Central 
Registration Depository (CRD System)).  The “without factual basis” category was 
changed back to “factually impossible or clearly erroneous.”  The “without legal merit” 
category, which had been changed to “fails to state a claim or is frivolous” in the 2002 
rule proposal, was changed to “the registered person was not involved in the alleged 
investment-related sales practice violation, forgery, theft, misappropriation, or 
conversion of funds”; and the “defamatory in nature” category was changed to “false.” 
Id. at 4.  The change to the first category is inconsequential because FINRA has 
repeatedly used the terms interchangeably.  The change to the second category, where 
the broker was “not involved in the alleged sales practice violation,” is well-dissected in 
Page v. Brookstreet, No. 09-00120, 2010 WL 3072237 (FINRA July 16, 2009), because 
the word “involved” is nowhere defined.  The change to the third category—from 
“defamatory in nature” to “false”—appears to have turned post-settlement expungement 
proceedings into ex parte mini-trials about the truth or falsity of the complaint. See 
Gilliam v. SagePoint Fin., Inc., No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949 (FINRA July 19, 
2013).  The award in that case states that the arbitrator (who also was on the arbitration 
panel in Page) reviewed the FINRA award database to try to learn how other arbitrators 
have ruled on expungement issues and concluded that 
most expungement decisions lump multiple grounds together 
without distinctions. Further, the reasons given frequently are not 
much more than conclusory reiterations of the findings and not 
careful discussions and analyses of the evidence. Many 
expungement decisions suggest that the panel did little more than 
have a mini ex parte trial on the merits, decided in favor of the 
respondent and granted expungement. 
Id. at *3; see also In re Horn v. UBS Fin. Inc., No. 10-02215, 2011 WL 6596031, at 
*3–4 (FINRA Dec. 7, 2012). 
 113. See NASD, PROPOSED RULE 2130, supra note 108. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
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erroneous or factually impossible” category, FINRA opened the door to 
a much easier expungement scheme.116 
The SEC approved NASD Rule 2130 (now FINRA Rule 2080) on 
December 16, 2003.117  In the approval order, the SEC determined that 
the Rule was “designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade, 
and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest.”118  The SEC 
wrote that “the potential involvement of [FINRA] at the court 
confirmation level will provide greater safeguards” of those interests.119  
As Part III.B of this Article demonstrates, both FINRA and the SEC 
were wrong in their belief that the court confirmation process provided 
“additional safeguards.”120 
In March 2004, FINRA issued Notice to Members 04-16.121  In that 
Notice, FINRA announced that the new expungement Rule would 
become effective on April 12, 2004.122  The Notice, curiously, never 
describes expungement relief as “extraordinary.”123  Instead, FINRA 
wrote: 
If the parties settle the arbitration, they may jointly ask the 
arbitration panel for a stipulated award and request that the panel 
make affirmative findings and order expungement based on one or 
more of the standards in Rule 2130. The arbitrators would determine 
whether to grant expungement relief and, if so, state in the award the 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See infra Parts IV-V. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See NASD, PROPOSED RULE 2130, supra note 108, at 8. 
 119. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 04-16, EXPUNGEMENT: MEMBERS’ USE OF 
AFFIDAVITS IN CONNECTION WITH STIPULATED AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS TO OBTAIN 
EXPUNGEMENT OF CUSTOMER DISPUTE INFORMATION UNDER RULE 2130, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003
235.pdf [hereinafter NASD, NTM 04-16]. 
 120. See infra Part III.B. 
 121. See NASD, NTM 04-16, supra note 119. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id.  The word appeared four times in NTM 01-65. See NASD, NTM 01-65, 
supra note 3.  FINRA’s Rule Filing for Rule 2130 states clearly that FINRA and other 
regulators participating in the CRD system agree that expungement is extraordinary 
relief. See NASD, PROPOSED RULE 2130, supra note 108, at 8, 23.  In support of its 
second proposed amendment to Rule Filing, FINRA wrote that it “recognize[d] that 
expungement of a CRD record under any condition is an extraordinary remedy and 
should only be used when the expunged information has no meaningful regulatory 
value.” See Letter from Shirley H. Weiss, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NASD, to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Secretary, SEC, at 8 (Sept. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p00
1019.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
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basis on which the expungement relief was granted. The arbitrators 
may require the submission of documents or a brief evidentiary 
hearing to gather the information necessary to make such 
findings.124 
After a five-year moratorium, expungement was back on the 
arbitrators’ docket.  However, the tenor of FINRA’s message had 
changed.  Granting expungement relief was cast in the Notice as a 
routine process in which the arbitrators’ job was to “gather documents” 
that would enable them to make the needed findings.125  The message in 
the Notice is that the arbitrators’ role is to execute the request for 
expungement rather than conduct an independent, skeptical review.126 
II.  EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS ARE CHALLENGED IN TWO STATES 
A.  THE STATE OF MARYLAND INTERVENES IN THE KARSNER CASE 
In 2006, Joseph Karsner IV, a broker in Maryland, received 
eighteen separate127 arbitrator-approved expungements.128  Each of these 
expungements had been preceded by a settlement.  In one of the cases 
where Mr. Karsner sought confirmation of one of his expungement 
applications, the Securities Commissioner in Maryland objected.129 
After receiving an award recommending expungement, Mr. 
Karsner petitioned the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia for confirmation of the award.130  He named as Respondents 
the investor and FINRA; neither Respondent appeared in the court to 
oppose the application.131  The court was prepared to grant Mr. 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See NASD, NTM 04-16, supra note 119, at 214. 
 125. Id. 
 126. To this day, FINRA’s template for arbitration awards of expungement makes 
reference to NTM 04-16 and no other FINRA document. See, e.g., arbitration awards 
cited infra note 235. 
 127. See PUB. INVESTORS ARBITRATION BAR ASS’N, STUDY OF STIPULATED OR 
SETTLED NASD CUSTOMER AWARDS ISSUED IN CALENDAR YEAR 2006 FOR WHICH 
STATEMENTS OF CLAIM WERE FILED ON, OR SUBSEQUENT TO, APRIL 12, 2004, at 14 
(2007), available at  http://piaba.org/system/files/pdfs/ 
September%2024%2C%202007%20including%20Expungement%20Study.pdf. 
 128. See Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 129. See Karsner v. Lothian, No. 07-00334, 2007 WL 4459698 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 
2007). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
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Karsner’s application when the Maryland Securities Commissioner filed 
a motion seeking permission to intervene.132  Karsner opposed the 
Commissioner’s motion,133 and the district court denied the 
Commissioner’s request to intervene.134  The U.S. Court of Appeals 
reversed, however, holding that as a regulator, the State was interested 
in the outcome of the court proceeding and was thus entitled to 
intervene, and the case was remanded to the district court.135 
The Court of Appeals’ decision is important not just because it 
recognizes the regulatory interest of the states in the CRD system.  In 
dicta, the court stated that the district court lacked the authority under 
the Federal Arbitration Act to grant confirmation because of the form of 
the award.136  Written on a template FINRA provided to the arbitrators, 
the award stated that “[t]he Panel recommends the expungement of all 
reference to the above-captioned arbitration from Respondent Karsner’s 
registration record maintained by the NASD Central Registration 
Depository (‘CRD’).”137  The D.C. Circuit’s opinion said: 
Section nine of the FAA provides for the judicial confirmation of an 
arbitration award.  But, the district court confirmed the arbitrators’ 
recommendation of expungement. An expungement 
recommendation, however, is not an award and, accordingly, the 
district court is without section 9 authority to “confirm” it.138 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See id.  The Maryland Securities Commissioner appealed the district court’s 
denial of her motion to intervene as of right in an arbitration confirmation proceeding. 
See id.  Karsner named Lothian and the NASD as parties to the confirmation 
proceedings. See id.  The NASD notified NASAA, and NASAA notified Melanie 
Lubin, the Maryland Securities Commissioner. See id.  Lubin objected. See id. 
 133. Neither Lothian nor FINRA appeared in the court proceedings. 
 134. Karsner v. Lothian, No. 07 cv334 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2007) (minute order). 
 135. Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
Commissioner’s motion was timely, as required for intervention as of right, and that the 
District Court lacked the authority to “confirm” arbitrator’s expungement 
recommendation). 
 136. Id. at 886. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  This theme that FINRA lacks the authority to empower courts to elevate a 
“recommendation” to a “direction” is inconsistent with the decision in In re Kay v. 
Abrams, 853 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008), which held that courts lack the power 
to review expungement awards to ensure that the awards fall into one of the three 
categories. See infra Part III.B.  Although both cases adopt the rationale of a limited 
judicial role, the Kay and Karsner courts reach opposite conclusions. Compare Kay, 
853 N.Y.S.2d 862, with Karsner, 532 F.3d at 876.  In Kay, the limited judicial role led 
to the court’s ruling that the court was bound by arbitration law to confirm the award—
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FINRA arbitration awards to this day, however, continue to use the 
same template and language as was used in Karsner—that the awards 
are “recommendations” of expungement and not directives.139  However, 
no other court has yet adopted the D.C. Circuit’s restrictive view of the 
confirmability of FINRA expungement awards.  FINRA has not 
changed its form award to change the word “recommends” to “directs,” 
probably because such language would violate the state laws that 
prevent arbitrators from altering state records—the laws that led to the 
original moratorium.140  The decision of the influential D.C. Circuit, 
however, looms over FINRA’s entire method of allowing brokers to 
seek expungement and could reappear at any time. 
The Karsner litigation ended a few months after the D.C. Circuit 
decision when the Maryland Securities Commissioner and Mr. Karsner 
entered into a settlement.141  Mr. Karsner consented to findings that he 
made unsuitable recommendations to his unsophisticated clients, that he 
had falsified New Account Forms, and that he had engaged in improper 
“switching” of mutual funds in his clients’ accounts.142  He also 
consented to Conclusions of Law that he violated the anti-fraud 
provision of Maryland’s securities laws and engaged in dishonest and 
unethical practices.143  In the Consent Order, Mr. Karsner agreed to 
withdraw his application in Karsner v. Lothian, to seek no further 
expungements, to cooperate with the State of Maryland to vacate the 
expungements he already obtained, to pay a $50,000, and not to renew 
his registration for ten years.144 
                                                                                                                 
even if that court were troubled by a flawed process under which the arbitrators granted 
expungement. See Kay, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 862.  The Karsner court, however, essentially 
declined to recognize or participate in the expungement process. See Karsner, 532 F.3d 
at 876. 
 139. See, e.g., any of the arbitration awards cited in this Article. 
 140. See supra Part I.B; see also NASD, NTM 99-09, supra note 61. 
 141. See Consent Order as to Joseph R. Karsner, IV and Joe Karsner & Associates, 
LLC, In re Karsner, No. 2002-0391 (Md. Sec. Comm’n Dec. 1, 2008), available at 
www.oag.state.md.us/Securities/Actions/2008/Karsner_COFinal_12_08.pdf. 
 142. Id. at 4–5. 
 143. Id. at 5–6. 
 144. Id. at 6. 
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B.  NEW YORK—THE SEVEN CASES 
At about the same time that Maryland was protesting the Karsner 
expungement, FINRA’s expungement procedures also drew the 
attention of the newly elected New York Attorney General Andrew 
Cuomo.145  The New York Attorney General made motions to intervene 
in seven cases where brokers were seeking to confirm expungement 
awards in New York state courts.146  The Attorney General made a 
variety of arguments, including concerns that Rule 2080 findings in 
awards were mere recitals, that expungements were being bought, and 
that expungements violate public policy.147 
As was the case in Maryland, the New York Attorney General’s 
request to intervene in the seven cases in 2007 was based on that 
office’s role as a securities regulator and its regulatory interest in 
preserving state records.148  The request to intervene was granted in all 
but one of the cases.149  The courts that granted intervention all found 
that New York State had a strong interest in maintaining the accuracy 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Karen Donovan, The Expungement Campaign, REGISTERED REP MAG. 
(Nov. 1, 2007), http://wealthmanagement.com/practice-management/expungement-
crusade; Elisofon & Cornehls, supra note 11, at 3. 
 146. The cases are: In re BNY Inv. Ctr. Inc. v. Bacchus, No. 109678/07, 2008 WL 
6603842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2008); In re UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Gibson, 17 Misc. 
3d 1131(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); In re Zaferiou v. Holgado, No. 102996/07, 2008 WL 
6677787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 28, 2008); In re Sage, Rutty & Co. v. Salzberg, No. 
0001942/2007, 2007 WL 2174117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2007); In re Kay v. Abrams, 
853 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); In re Johnson v. Summit Equities, Inc., 864 
N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); and In re Walker v. Connelly, 21 Misc.3d 1123(A) 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 147. See Elisofon & Cornehls, supra note 11, at 3.  The Attorney General also 
argued in at least one of the cases that expungement should be denied because CRD 
records are state records that are subject to retention requirements and preclude 
arbitrator authority to order their expungement. See e.g., BNY, 2008 WL 6603842.  That 
argument was rejected in BNY on the ground that, inter alia, the Attorney General had 
not identified any such requirements. See id.  That same court also rejected the 
argument that the expungement was just a “recommendation,” not an award that could 
be confirmed. Id. 
 148. See cases cited supra note 146. 
 149. In Kay v. Abrams, the court denied the motion to intervene on the ground that it 
was “moot” because the court determined that it lacked the power under the Federal 
Arbitration Act and New York arbitration law to conduct the kind of judicial review for 
which the Attorney General advocated. 853 N.Y.S.2d at 3–4. 
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and integrity of the CRD records for the protection of New York’s 
investing public, just as had the D.C. Circuit in Karsner v. Lothian.150 
The New York courts, however, all viewed their role in the 
expungement controversy as highly limited, rejecting the policy 
arguments made by the Attorney General.151  Arbitration law proved to 
be insurmountable obstacle, and a prior decision of an intermediate 
appellate court in Goldstein v. Preisler152 established the point.  
Goldstein was a 2005 case that predated the Attorney General’s efforts 
and attention to the expungement issue.153  The Appellate Division ruled 
that judicial review of such awards was limited to the usual grounds for 
vacatur of arbitration awards—fraud, arbitral misconduct, arbitrator 
partiality, irrationality, and manifest disregard of the law.154  The 
Appellate Division’s decision in Goldstein rejected any argument that 
the public’s interest in preserving the CRD records was grounds to 
refuse confirmation.155  Indeed, the Appellate Division stated that the 
lower court exceeded its judicial role by denying the broker’s 
application to confirm the expungement award on policy grounds 
because that action constituted “an impermissible modification of the 
award that affected the substantive rights of the parties.”156 
The Attorney General was confronted by the issues in Goldstein in 
each of the seven cases.  In 2007, in two of the cases where the Attorney 
General intervened, the courts initially declined to confirm awards of 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See, e.g., UBS, 17 Misc. 3d 1131(A).  That case attracted the attention of 
NASAA and the Securities Industry Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), both of 
which filed briefs as amicus.  After granting the Attorney General’s motion orally, the 
court entered a formal written decision. Id. at 1.  In it, the court noted that “the Attorney 
General clearly has an interest which may be affected by the court’s judgment, and 
which [sic] not been adequately represented by any other party, since respondent 
Gibson, the complainant in the arbitration proceeding, has failed to appear and has not 
opposed expungement in this case.” Id. at 4.  That decision covered both the (separate) 
Kurasch (UBS) and Johnson (Summit Equities) applications, which had been 
consolidated by the court. Id. at 2.  Intervention was also granted in other cases. See, 
e.g., cases cited supra note 146. 
 151. See Elisofon & Cornehls, supra note 11. 
 152. In re Goldstein v. Preisler, 805 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Goldstein, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 649.  The Goldstein court also stated that because 
the awards came in the form of stipulations, they were especially insulated, because 
stipulations can only be set-aside in cases of fraud or duress. Id. 
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expungement on the ground that the awards were not in accord with the 
requirements of FINRA Rule 2080.157  These courts objected to 
confirmation because the awards in those cases only stated that the cases 
fell into the “false” category of Rule 2080.158  The courts rejected the 
initial applications to confirm the awards because the arbitrators gave no 
explanation, and made no findings to support their decision that the 
claims were false.159  These two cases were thus remanded to the 
arbitrators, who then modified the awards to provide brief explanations, 
and those awards were confirmed.160 
In re Johnson v. Summit Equities, Inc. was the first of these New 
York court cases that preliminarily declined confirmation.161  Justice 
Marcy Kahn (who consolidated Johnson with another similar cases 
assigned to her)162 refused to confirm those two awards of 
expungement.163  Justice Kahn rejected both because each award merely 
recited the Rule 2080 grounds in boilerplate fashion, without any 
arbitrator “findings,” elaboration, or explanation.164  Rule 2080, she 
held, imposed “exacting standards for expungement,” and required that 
the arbitrators make “affirmative findings of specific facts” supporting 
their conclusion that the case fell into one of the three expungement 
categories.165  The bald recitation by the arbitrators of the Rule 2080 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See In re Johnson v. Summit Equities, Inc., 864 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2008); In re Sage, Rutty & Co. v. Salzberg, No. 0001942/2007, 2007 WL 2174117 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2007). 
 158. See Johnson, 864 N.Y.S.2d 873; see also Sage, Rutty, 2007 WL 2174117. 
 159. See cases cited supra note 158. 
 160. See id. 
 161. 864 N.Y.S.2d 873.  The decision in Johnson covered both that case and UBS 
(Kurasch) v. Gibson. Id. at 882. 
 162. See In re UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Gibson, 17 Misc. 3d 1131(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2007).  The two cases had some differences:  one was a stipulated award, and the other 
was an award of expungement after a full adversarial hearing.  According to Justice 
Kahn, each contained the same defect. See Johnson, 864 N.Y.S.2d at 901.  The 
arbitrators had made no findings to support their conclusion that expungement was 
warranted under FINRA Rule 2080(a). See id. 
 163. See id. at 901. 
 164. Id. at 890–95. 
 165. Id. at 898 (“Nothing in either award demonstrates the ‘finding’ of any facts 
specific to the case.  The Summit award states neither the conduct in which petitioners 
were not engaged, nor any facts supporting a conclusion that petitioners were not the 
parties involved.  In UBS, nothing indicates which aspects of the customer complaint 
were impossible or erroneous.  Moreover, the language of the findings in each case are 
couched in the disjunctive as alternative conclusions, sounding more like general 
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grounds was, in Justice Kahn’s view, insufficient, even where a full 
hearing was held and the investor’s complaint was dismissed.166 
Justice Kahn distinguished Goldstein because the award in that case 
predated Rule 2080167 and thus was neither subject to nor reviewed for 
the issues associated with the “findings” requirement of Rule 2080.168  
In Justice Kahn’s view, a higher degree of judicial review was 
appropriate following the effective date of Rule 2080 because Rule 2080 
created “policy considerations and attendant roles and responsibilities . . 
. for the NASD, state regulators [and] reviewing courts” in expungement 
situations that were not at issue when Goldstein was decided.169  The 
combined requirements in the Rule of “affirmative findings” and 
judicial confirmation convinced her that FINRA anticipated and 
                                                                                                                 
denials characteristic of a pleading, rather than specific findings after a hearing or upon 
the parties’ stipulated agreement in the particular case.”). 
 166. Id. at 891–92 (finding that “only statements which contain evidentiary facts and 
demonstrate that the circumstances of Rule 2130(b)(1) exist in a particular case 
constitute factual findings that support the conclusions represented by the Rule’s 
standards”).  The decision further highlights that “the qualifier ‘affirmative’ was added 
to proposed Rule 2130 in order to meet concerns that members seeking expungement 
relief would arrange for ‘findings’ which consisted simply of pro forma recitals that 
‘matched [the wording of] one of the required standards.” Id. at 892–99; see also Order 
Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1, Thereto, and 
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 2, 
Thereto, Relating to Proposed NASD Rule 2130 Concerning the Expungement of 
Customer Dispute Information From the Central Registration Depository System, 68 
Fed. Reg. 74,667, 74,670 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
 167. In Kay v. Abrams, the court explained the Attorney General’s new-found 
interest in the subject of expungement: 
At oral argument held on April 27, 2007, the Attorney General took 
the position that because of the claimed partial State ownership 
interest in CRD records, the arbitrator lacked the power to grant 
expungement as such an order would, in essence, be destroying State 
property. Consequently, it was contended that the court lacked the 
power to confirm such an award (tr. p. 35–37). When it was noted 
that no such claim had ever previously been asserted by the office of 
the Attorney General, it was stated that this was a new policy of 
Andrew Cuomo, the present holder of that office, which was decided 
upon in February of last year (tr. pp. 26–32). 
853 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864–65  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 168. See Johnson, 864 N.Y.S.2d at 894. 
 169. Id. at 895. 
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intended greater judicial review, and she was prepared to conduct it.170  
However, Justice Kahn felt that such review could not occur in those 
two cases because the arbitrators had failed to make the required 
findings.171  Justice Kahn remanded the matters to the arbitrators for 
further action in accordance with Rule 2080.172  One of the two brokers 
pursued the matter further before the arbitrators; the other did not.173  
After the arbitrators entered a modified award with an explanation 
Justice Kahn sought, she confirmed the award.174 
Similarly, in Sage, Rutty & Co. v. Salzberg, after granting the 
Attorney General permission to intervene, a New York court criticized 
the award for failing to make the affirmative findings required by Rule 
2080.175  The award showed that the arbitrators never held any 
evidentiary hearings to support their conclusion that the grounds of Rule 
2080 were met.176  The court held that Goldstein applied and that there 
was no room in the law for greater judicial review of expungement 
awards than exists for other types of arbitration awards.177  However, the 
court also held that the arbitrators’ mere recitation of grounds—without 
having ever held a hearing—was “irrational,”178 and irrationality is a 
recognized basis for declining confirmation under New York arbitration 
law.179  Thus, as did Justice Kahn in Johnson,180 the judge in Sage, Rutty 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. at 890. 
 171. Id. at 895–96. 
 172. Id. at 901. 
 173. The arbitrators in the UBS portion of the case subsequently issued a modified 
award making “findings.” In re Gibson v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 06-00520, 2007 
WL 562503 (FINRA June 15, 2009).  FINRA’s award database does not show any 
record of further proceedings in Johnson, and there were no further court proceedings 
in that case. 
 174. See Order and Judgment, In re UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Gibson, No. 103188/07 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 2009). 
 175. In re Sage, Rutty & Co. v. Salzberg, No. 0001942/2007, 2007 WL 2174117 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2007). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.; see also In re Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308 
(1984). 
 180. In re Johnson v. Summit Equities, Inc., 864 N.Y.S.2d 873, 901 (Sup. Ct. 2008).  
Cf. Walker v. Connelly, 873 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct. 2008).  In Walker, the court 
observed that even though the award in the case contained only a bare recitation of the 
Rule 2130 grounds and no “affirmative findings,” the arbitrators held a telephone 
conference call with counsel for the parties, and received an affidavit from the brokers 
seeking expungement and “Stipulated Factual Particulars” signed by counsel for both 
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remanded the case for further proceedings before the arbitrators.181  
Following that remand, a hearing before the arbitrators, and a new 
award with “findings,” the court confirmed the award.182 
In the other four cases, the courts were either satisfied that the 
Rule’s requirements had been met, or ruled that it was not a court’s role 
to determine whether the Rule’s requirements had been met.183  None of 
the New York courts held, as the Karsner court stated in dicta, that the 
award was not confirmable because it was only a “recommendation” and 
not a decision or directive.184 
The other New York award review cases all resulted in easy 
confirmation.  For example, in Kay v. Abrams,185 Justice Edward Lehner 
                                                                                                                 
the investor and the brokers.  The Stipulation, the court wrote, was “essentially [a] 
recant[ation] of the allegations in his Statement of Claim,” and the broker’s affidavit 
was a total denial. Walker, 873 N.Y.S.2d 516, at *6. 
 181. See In re Sage, Rutty & Co. v. Salzberg, No. 0001942/2007, 2007 WL 
2174117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2007). 
 182. See Salzberg v. Sage Rutty, No. 05-03906 (FINRA Oct. 24, 2007), aff’d, Sage, 
Rutty, 2007 WL 2174117.  Sage, Rutty is unusual because it was the only case in which 
the investor appeared along with the Attorney General to oppose the expungement. See 
id.  When the matter was remanded to the arbitrators, she appeared there as well. Id.  In 
both proceedings, the investor was pro se. Id.  The investor tried to explain her earlier 
consent to expungement by stating that she felt pressured by her lawyer to accept a 
settlement and that having agreed, she still believed that her allegations were true. Id.  
However, as both the court and the arbitrators observed, her agreement to expunge was 
made one full month after she had accepted the monetary settlement.  After hearing her 
testimony, the arbitrators modified their prior award to add that finding.  The arbitrators 
then wrote that her complaint was “clearly erroneous” and lacked merit, and 
recommended expungement.  The court then confirmed the award.  BNY v. Bacchus 
presented a similar settlement scenario.  In that case, the court observed that agreement 
to expunge was entered into two years after the settlement and thus, could not have 
been “paid-for.” In re BNY Inv. Ctr. Inc. v. Bacchus, No. 109678/07, 2008 WL 
6603842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2008). 
 183. See Bacchus, 2008 WL 6603842; In re Zaferiou v. Holgado, No. 102996/07, 
2008 WL 6677787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 28, 2008); In re Kay v. Abrams, 853 N.Y.S.2d 
862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); In re Walker v. Connelly, 21 Misc. 3d 1123(A) (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2008). 
 184. See discussion supra note 138; see, e.g., Bacchus, 2008 WL 6603842. Cf. 
Dailey v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., No. 08-1577, 2009 WL 4782151 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 8, 2009) (confirming a FINRA award that recommends expungement and citing 
Karsner v. Lothian but not addressing at all the dicta about whether recommendations 
create confirmable awards). 
 185. See Kay, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 862. 
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adhered strictly to Goldstein.186  He ruled that courts did not have any 
authority whatsoever to question the conclusions reached by arbitrators 
that Rule 2080’s requirements had or had not been satisfied.187  In his 
view, it was irrelevant whether the arbitrators conducted any hearings on 
expungement grounds or made any affirmative findings.188  Federal and 
state arbitration law precluded all the types of judicial inquiry the 
Attorney General sought.189  According to Justice Lehner, New York 
law was clear—neither the FINRA Rule190 nor the Attorney General’s 
arguments about protecting the public interest191 changed the very 
limited review allowed of arbitration awards under state law and the 
Federal Arbitration Act.192   FINRA could not pass rules that effectively 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. at 866 (“[S]ince [Goldstein] is on ‘all fours’ with the case at bar and there is 
no contrary First Department decision, the court feels bound by the determination 
therein.”). 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. (“[T]raditionally, there is no mandate that an arbitrator give any reason for 
an award. Thus, for judicial confirmation, there is no requirement for the arbitrator to 
make any of the specific findings listed in the Rule.”). 
 189. Id. at 865.  The court wrote: 
While the Attorney General has declined to take a position as to 
whether the application for confirmation is governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or the CPLR, it is clear that this matter 
involving the sale of securities is governed by the FAA. However, 
the parties agree that the rules on confirmation under the FAA and 
the CPLR are essentially similar. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 190. Id.  Justice Lehner read Rule 2130’s requirement of findings and grounds to be 
addressed solely to the portion of the Rule relating to FINRA’s waiver of the 
requirement that it be named in the confirmation proceeding. According to the court, 
FINRA’s amicus brief states that “its intent in adopting the Rule was to in no way affect 
the law with respect to the judicial confirmation of arbitration awards.” Id. 
 191. The judge in Zaferiou v. Holgado went further, stating that Goldstein 
“demonstrates that there is no public policy against expungement.” No. 102996/07, 
2008 WL 6677787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 28, 2008). 
 192. See Kay, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 862.  Indeed, Justice Lehner seems to reject the 
notion that Rule 2130 empowered the Attorney General to oppose confirmation of 
arbitral findings on policy grounds.  “[A] regulation of NASD, even if approved by the 
SEC, cannot modify the FAA which was adopted through an act of Congress.” Id. at 
865; see also Zaferiou, 2008 WL 6677787; In re BNY Inv. Ctr. Inc. v. Bacchus, No. 
109678/07, 2008 WL 6603842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2008); In re Walker v. 
Connelly, 21 Misc. 3d 1123(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).  To these courts, even the FINRA 
Rule 2130 requirement that the arbitrators make “findings” cannot be enforced by 
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amended the Federal Arbitration Act to elevate the level of review of 
FINRA’s arbitration awards.193 
At the end of his decision in Kay, however, Justice Lehner 
expressed discomfort with expunging information where “the arbitrator 
gave no explanation for his factual finding.”194  It did not matter in the 
case before him because the law was clear and because the grounds for 
vacatur were limited, but Justice Lehner offered a note of optimism.195  
He observed that improvement was coming because three days before 
oral argument in the case, FINRA announced that it was seeking a 
change in its Rules to require that arbitrators hold a recorded hearing on 
expungement.196 
The New York Attorney General’s efforts to oppose expungement 
were unsuccessful because his policy arguments were rejected.197  He 
was left with a few quibbles about the form of the award, but that was 
all.198  Two things, however, had become apparent:  (1) FINRA had 
succeeded in empowering its arbitrators to grant expungement, and (2) 
the regulators’ interest, though acknowledged by all of the courts, had 
largely been emasculated. 
III.  FINRA AMENDS ITS RULES AGAIN IN 2008 
A.  FINRA ADDS RULE 12805 
FINRA’s response to the criticisms and the cases was to augment 
Rule 2080 by trying to add more safeguards to the process.199  In its 
                                                                                                                 
courts because arbitration law provides that arbitrators need not give reasons for their 
awards. See cases cited supra. 
 193. Kay, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 865.  In this regard, Justice Lehner’s decision 
foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (holding that the parties, in their arbitration agreements, 
cannot empower or authorize courts to conduct any greater level of review of arbitration 
awards than is provided in the FAA).  
 194. Kay, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 867. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See discussion supra note 147. 
 198. See Elisofon & Cornehls, supra note 11. 
 199. See Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Rule 12805 of the NASD Code of 
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and Rule 13805 of the NASD Code of 
Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes as FINRA Rules into a Consolidated 
Rulebook, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/RuleFilings/ 
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March 2008 rule filing,200 FINRA admitted that its system was not 
working as anticipated: 
Sometimes, arbitrators will order expungement at the conclusion of 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the case. More often, 
however, arbitrators will order expungement at the request of a party 
to facilitate settlement of the dispute.  For example, customers may 
receive monetary compensation as part of a settlement, the terms of 
which require the customer to consent to (or not oppose) the entry of 
a stipulated award containing an order of expungement. In such 
cases, FINRA expected that arbitrators would examine the amount 
paid to any party and any other terms and conditions of the 
settlement that might raise concerns about the associated person’s 
behavior before awarding expungement. Contrary to this 
expectation, however, arbitrators often did not inquire into the terms 
of settlement agreements.201 
Thus, proposed Rule 12805 requires arbitration panels that were 
asked to approve of an expungement following a settlement to “hold a 
recorded hearing session (by telephone or in person) regarding the 
appropriateness of expungement.”202  The arbitrators would be required 
to review settlement documents and consider the amount of payments to 
the investor.203  They would also have to indicate in the award which of 
the grounds in Rule 2080 “serve(s) as the basis for its expungement 
order” and to “provide a brief written explanation of the reason(s) for its 
finding that one or more Rule 2080 grounds for expungement applies to 
the facts of the case.”204 
FINRA’s filing for Rule 12805 states that the added requirement 
for arbitrators to hold a recorded hearing would assure that the 
arbitrators “perform the critical fact finding necessary before granting 
                                                                                                                 
2008/P117539 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 200. Rule 12805 was proposed before the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Karsner v. 
Lothian, wherein the court did all but declare that FINRA’s expungement process—
with awards that “recommend” expungement followed by court confirmation—was 
unworkable. See supra Part IV.  Thus, the court did not address that issue, which 
continues to lurk to this day. See id. 
 201. Self-Regulatory Organizations:  Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.; 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Codes of 
Arbitration Procedure to Establish New Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow when 
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,308, 18,309 (Apr. 3, 
2008). 
 202. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(a), supra note 32. 
 203. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(b), supra note 33. 
 204. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(c), supra note 35. 
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expungement.”205  FINRA acknowledged that the hearing it envisioned 
was likely to be ex parte.206  First, FINRA stated that the customers 
could participate in such hearings.207  However, it must have been 
apparent to FINRA that such participation rarely occurred.208  Settling 
respondents often bargain for an agreement to not oppose expungement, 
and even when no such bargain is struck, investors who settle cases do 
not want to expend the time and money (including attorney’s fees) to 
appear in a case that had already settled.209  Such investors were not 
showing up to contest expungements before 2008, so FINRA had no 
basis to believe that they would do so after 2008.210 
FINRA’s second argument for perpetuating its system of arbitrator 
expungements was that its arbitrators are “trained to conduct ex parte 
proceedings.”211  However, as will be seen,212 no amount of arbitrator 
training can cure the inherent problem that non-adversarial, one-sided 
hearings inherently lack the adversarial mechanism needed for “fact 
finding.”213 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See Letter from Margo A. Hassan, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, SEC, at 2–3 
(June 11, 2008), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/ 
@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p038692.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Hassan 
to SEC]. 
 206. Id. at 2 n.7. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3.  In addition, as FINRA observed in the 
quotation above from the Rule filing (cited in supra note 199), such parties could have 
agreed to not oppose expungement as a condition of settlement.  Of all of the 
arbitrations studied for and cases cited in this Article, there was only one case of 
opposition—the investor in Sage, Rutty. 2007 WL 2174117.  Notably, that investor was 
pro se and thus, hardly had a fair fight because the respondent was represented by 
experienced arbitration counsel. 
 210. Letter from Karen Tyler, NASAA President and N.D. Sec. Comm’r, to Nancy 
M. Morris, Secretary, SEC, at 3 (Apr. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2008-010/finra2008010-7.pdf (showing that 
FINRA and NASAA knew since 2008 that investors who settled had no incentive to 
appear at expungement hearings).  Indeed, there is a disincentive because lawyers cost 
money. 
 211. Letter from Hassan to SEC, supra note 205, at 3; see also Notice of Filing of 
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure 
to Establish New Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When Considering Requests for 
Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,308. 
 212. See infra Part V.A . 
 213. In its response to the comments received by the SEC, FINRA wrote: 
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Despite these obvious flaws, the SEC approved the proposed Rule 
on October 30, 2008.214  Henceforth, FINRA arbitrators were required to 
hold a “hearing”—formal or informal and in person or telephonic—
before granting an expungement request.215  The arbitrators would have 
to consider, at the least, the settlement amount216 and would have to 
write something about the grounds for granting expungement.217  
                                                                                                                 
To help prepare arbitrators for the new rule requirements, FINRA 
plans to (1) notify all arbitrators of the changes; (2) update its 
expungement training program to reflect the changes encompassed 
by the rule proposal and encourage all of its arbitrators to take the 
training; (3) publish an article in The Neutral Corner explaining the 
new rule; and (4) conduct a call-in workshop during which staff will 
discuss the rule changes and allow arbitrators and mediators to ask 
questions about the rules. 
Letter from Hassan to SEC, supra note 205, at 3 n.8. 
 214. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
Incorporated;  Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change 
to Increase the Maximum Term for FLEX Options, 73 Fed. Reg. 66086 (Nov. 6, 2008). 
 215. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805 (2013), Expungement of Customer Dispute 
Information Under Rule 2080, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=7229 (last visited June 16, 2013). 
In order to grant expungement of customer dispute information 
under Rule 2080, the panel must: 
(a) Hold a recorded hearing session (by telephone or in person) 
regarding the appropriateness of expungement. This paragraph will 
apply to cases administered under Rule 12800 even if a customer did 
not request a hearing on the merits. 
(b) In cases involving settlements, review settlement documents and 
consider the amount of payments made to any party and any other 
terms and conditions of a settlement. 
(c) Indicate in the arbitration award which of the Rule 2080 grounds 
for expungement serve(s) as the basis for its expungement order and 
provide a brief written explanation of the reason(s) for its finding 
that one or more Rule 2080 grounds for expungement applies to the 
facts of the case. 
(d) Assess all forum fees for hearing sessions in which the sole topic 
is the determination of the appropriateness of expungement against 
the parties requesting expungement relief. 
Id. 
 216. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(b), supra note 33 (requiring review 
settlement the amount of payments made to any party). 
 217. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(c), supra note 35 (requiring arbitrators to 
draft a brief written explanation of the reason(s) for its finding that one or more Rule 
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However, there would still be no prosecutor or complainant challenging 
the broker’s version of events,218 and only exculpatory evidence would 
be presented.219  There would still be no advance notice to either 
FINRA’s Enforcement Division or any state regulator and no 
opportunity for them to intervene or object before it was too late.220  
Expungement awards would still be framed as “recommendations” and 
not directions, leaving the Karsner decision lurking in the 
background.221 
B.  FINRA EXPANDS REPORTING OF CUSTOMER ARBITRATIONS 
While the attention was focused on the expungement process, a 
then-existing hole in CRD and BrokerCheck was growing.  Customer 
dispute information on CRD and BrokerCheck gets into CRD only when 
brokerage firms report.222  Prior to 2009, the forms FINRA uses—the U4 
and the U5223—did not require reporting in cases where a customer filed 
a lawsuit or arbitration against the firm without also naming the broker 
as a defendant or a respondent,224 and investors’ attorneys usually do not 
                                                                                                                 
2080 grounds for expungement applies to the facts of the case). See also Notice to 
Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement Guidance, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/arbitration/specialprocedures/expungeme
nt/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 218. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805 (2013); FINRA MANUAL, RULE 2080 
(providing for neither notice to prosecutors or regulators nor a right to intervene). 
 219. See infra note 233 and accompanying text (regarding the fact that only three 
investors appeared to contest expungements in 205 expungement arbitrations). 
 220. See Elisofon & Cornhels, supra note 11 (stating that brokers seeking 
expungement should expect greater review by arbitrators and expressing concern that 
Rule 2080 does not invite greater judicial scrutiny of expungement awards). 
 221. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text. 
 222. See NASD, NTM 01-65, supra note 3. 
 223. See Question 14I on Form U4 and Question 7E on Form U5, available at 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/CRD/FilingGuidance/p005235 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 224. That is true even if, based on the body of the pleadings, the broker’s conduct is 
the obvious subject of the complaint. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-23:  SEC 
APPROVAL OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO FORMS U4 AND U5 AND FINRA RULE 8312, at 4–
5 (2009), available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Notices/2009/P118706 
[hereinafter FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-23]; SIFMA, COMMENT LETTER, supra 
note 7, at 3. 
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name the broker as a respondent in arbitrations.225  As a result, many 
arbitration filings that involved the conduct of “unnamed” brokers went 
unreported on CRD and BrokerCheck.226 
In 2009, FINRA decided to plug the hole.  Beginning May 18, 
2009, arbitration filings (and lawsuits) would have to be reported as 
customer dispute information on a broker’s CRD so long as it is 
reasonably clear from the body of the pleadings that the broker was 
involved in an alleged sales practice violation.227  This change greatly 
increased the incidence of reporting.228  That increased incidence in 
reporting, in turn, created an increase in the volume of expungement 
requests, including the volume of requests in settled cases.229  The 
incidence of expungement requests was about to explode. 
IV.  A STUDY OF THE EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS IN SETTLED CASES IN 
2013 
In the wake of all these changes, the Author conducted a study of 
arbitration awards in settled cases.230  The period of time studied was the 
first six months of 2013.  Using the FINRA database of arbitration 
awards, an electronic search was conducted for all arbitration awards in 
these periods that contain the word “expungement.”  These awards were 
reviewed to identify only those which:  (a) began as customer-initiated 
arbitrations or complaints, (b) were settled for money prior to the 
arbitrators holding any adversarial hearings, and (c) involved the broker 
(as a named or unnamed party) appearing before an arbitration panel 
requesting expungement. 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Proposed Changes to 
Forms U4 and U5, Exchange Act Release No. 59,616, 2009 WL 1212330 (Mar. 20, 
2009); see also DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL (5th 
ed., 2012).  Principles of respondeat superior make the naming of brokers unnecessary. 
See id.  
 226. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-23, supra note 224. 
 227. See FINRA, Form U4, at 14(I)(c) and 14(I)(d), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportd
ocs/p015112.pdf (last visited June 16. 2013) (requiring the filing party to disclose 
whether it has been involved in one or more sales practice violations that settled a 
“customer complaint/arbitration” prior to May 18, 2009 for an amount of $10,000 or 
after May 18, 2009 for an amount of $15,000 or more). 
 228. See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. 
 229. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 230. See LIPNER, ANALYSIS OF EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS FOR FIRST HALF OF 2013, 
supra note 37. 
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Two hundred and five such awards were found.  Only thirteen 
resulted in a denial of the request for expungement while 192 cases 
resulted in recommendations of expungement.231  Thus, the 
expungement rate was 93.66%. 
The investor objected to expungement in only three of the 205 
cases.232  In each of those cases, the request for expungement was 
denied.233  There were no cases where an investor objected and 
expungement was granted. 
In ten of the cases, the investor was not named as a party.234  In 
those cases, the broker named only his firm as a party, a clever device 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Separate customer arbitrations were expunged through a single expungement 
proceeding in five of the cases studied. See infra note 240.  Forty-eight of the cases 
involved erasure of records from CRD of either multiple complaints or multiple 
brokers/associated persons.  See note 240 for examples of multiple-claimants cases.  
For multiple-broker cases, see, for example, Dake v. Insphere, 12-01045; Merlin v. 
Briggs, No. 12-00935l; Stolte v. UBS, No. 11-04455; Barker, No. 12-01305.  In the 205 
cases studied, a total of 318 expungements were granted.  Only thirteen expungement 
requests were denied. See LIPNER, ANALYSIS OF EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS FOR FIRST 
HALF OF 2013, supra note 37 (case numbers 21, 24, 25, 26, 42, 44, 67, 68, 93, 152, 153, 
189, 199 in study).  Thus, the ratio of total grants to requests is 96.1%. 
 232. See infra note 241. 
 233. See In re Jessop v. Pruneyard Fin. Grp., No. 11-03992, 2013 WL 1857492 
(FINRA Apr. 12, 2013); In re Levi v. Capital Brokerage Corp., No. 11-0345, 2013 WL 
772751 (FINRA Feb. 2, 2013); In re Ahonen v. Golden Beneficial Sec., No, 11-2777, 
2013 WL 3365258 (FINRA June 27, 2013). In Horn v. UBS Fin. Inc., a case outside of 
the studied period, one arbitrator dissented from an award of expungement, writing that 
the broker did not show that the claims were “‘factually impossible’ but only that the 
claims lacked merit.” No. 10-02215, 2011 WL 6596031, at *3–4 (FINRA Dec. 7, 2012) 
(Arbitrator Abigail Pessen, dissenting).  The dissenting arbitrator stated that she did not 
believe that FINRA’s expungement rule applied to such a case.  The fact that the 
claimant in that case opposed the expungement was a factor in that arbitrator’s decision. 
Id. 
 234. See Vaughn v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, No. 13-00173, 2013 WL 
3271289 (FINRA June 17, 2013); Hyman v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-02969, 2013 WL 
2368505 (FINRA Aug. 5, 2013); Headrick v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., No.11-02059, 2013 
WL 2368495 (FINRA May 17, 2013); Miller v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 11-03509, 2013 
WL 1933872 (FINRA May 1, 2013); Castillo v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., No. 12-03633, 
2013 WL 1933873 (FINRA Aug. 3, 2013); Lureen v. EPlanning Sec., No.11-02066, 
2013 WL 1088694 (FINRA Mar. 13, 2013); Barker v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01305, 
2013 WL 595840 (FINRA Feb. 26, 2013); Glubiak v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01156, 
2013 WL 395553 (FINRA Jan. 23, 2013); Bott v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12-02699, 
2013 WL 395553 (FINRA Jan. 25, 2013). 
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that deprived the investor of notice that the investor’s complaint was 
subject to an expungement proceeding.235 
The study shows that 150 of the hearings were done by telephone 
and that thirty-eight were in-person hearings.236  Seventeen of the 
awards do not state whether the hearing was in person or on the 
phone.237 
Of the awards, 193 resulted from a half-day hearing session (four 
hours or less, including breaks).238  Ten cases involved two sessions, and 
only two took three or four sessions.  No cases took more than four 
sessions.  The incidence of post-settlement expungement awards is 
greater than 20% of all the settled cases.239 
The 205 awards studied for this Article represent the expungement 
of customer complaints in 257 customer-initiated arbitrations.240  FINRA 
reports that 2,730 arbitration cases were closed between January 1, 
2013, and June 30, 2013.241  FINRA also states that approximately 60% 
of arbitration filings involved customer claims (this statistic is 
hereinafter referred to as the “case-type ratio”).242  Assuming that the 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See LIPNER, ANALYSIS OF EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS FOR FIRST HALF OF 2013, 
supra note 37 (case numbers 30, 33, 53, 54, 116, 153, 161, 183, 185, 198). 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. (case numbers 2, 7, 25, 32, 35, 49, 50, 60, 61, 114, 133, 135, 141, 145, 
151, 152, 174). 
 238. FINRA measures sessions in half-day increments. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 
12000(n) (2013), Code Of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes. 
 239. To obtain expungement, of course, the awards must first be confirmed in court 
pursuant to FINRA Rule 2080. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 2080 (2013), Obtaining an 
Order of Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the Central Registration 
Depository (CRD) System. 
 240. The awards in five cases involved the expungement of multiple arbitration 
filings. See Pyle v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-02351, 2013 WL 2898285 (FINRA 
June 6, 2013) (expunging three separate arbitration complaints expunged); Hyman v. 
Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-02969, 2013 WL 2368505 (FINRA Aug. 5, 2013) (expunging 
eight separate complaints); Miller v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 11-03509, 2013 WL 1933872 
(FINRA May 1, 2013) (expunging eleven separate arbitration complaints); Barker v. 
Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01305, 2013 WL 595840 (FINRA Feb. 26, 2013) (expunging 
thirty-one separate arbitration complaints); Glubiak v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01156, 
2013 WL 395553 (FINRA Jan. 23, 2013) (expunging four separate arbitration 
complaints).  The 205 awards studied thus represent the closure of 257 arbitration cases. 
 241. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (reporting case statistics for the first six months of 2013). 
 242. This statistic is for cases filed in 2012.  Report, Richard Berry, Senior Vice 
President and Director of Case Administration and Regional Office Services, FINRA to 
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case-type ratio for closed cases is approximately the same as the case-
type ratio for filings,243 there were 1,422 customer cases that closed 
between January 1 and June 30, 2013.244  FINRA also reports that during 
that period, 246 customer cases went to hearing,245 leading to the 
estimate that, between January 1 and June 30, 2013, 1,176 customer 
cases were either settled or withdrawn.246 
As stated, there were 205 expungement hearings, representing 257 
customer arbitrations.  Therefore, approximately 21.9% (viz., 257/1176) 
of the cases that settled in the first half of 2013 involved some post-
settlement expungement proceedings.  At the established rate of 93.7% 
identified in this study, about 20.4% of settlements in the first half of 
2013 resulted in awards of expungement. 
The study also shows that the incidence of expungement is rising.  
In the fourth quarter of 2011, for example, there were sixty-one post-
settlement awards involving expungement, compared to eighty-nine in 
the fourth quarter of 2012.247  The 40% increase in volume from 2011 to 
2013 is probably attributable to the 2009 reporting change detailed in 
Part III.B of this Article.248  However, some of the increase might also 
                                                                                                                 
Expert Roundtable, Aug. 2, 2013 (Boston, Mass.) (copy of presentation on file with 
Author).  It was 61% in the first six months of 2013. See id. 
 243. FINRA reports an average turnover time (i.e., filing to case closure) of 14.4 
months. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 244. See LIPNER, ANALYSIS OF EXPUNGEMENT AWARDS FOR FIRST HALF OF 2013, 
supra note 37. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. The data supporting these statistics are on file with the Author as FINRA does 
not keep historical statistics. 
 248. The rise in the number of expungements from 2011 to 2013 cannot by itself be 
attributed to the increase in cases filings following the 2008 market problems.  
Arbitration cases on average take fourteen months (sixteen to seventeen months for 
non-simplified cases) from filing to case-closure. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/ 
AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).  The greatest number of 
filings occurred in 2009 (over 7,000 cases customer and non-customer cases), followed 
by significant decreases in succeeding years. Id.  Thus, by the end of 2011, most of 
those 2009 cases had worked their way through the system.  Accordingly, the increase 
in expungement applications from the fourth quarter to 2011 through the fourth quarter 
of 2012 to the first half of 2013 cannot be attributed to the 2009 increase in filings.  By 
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be due to increased broker awareness of the impact of BrokerCheck or 
the apparent ease of obtaining expungement.249 
V.  RESOLVING THE EXPUNGMENT MESS 
A.  THE TROUBLE WITH EXPUNGEMENTS 
The public disclosure of un-adjudicated customer complaints by an 
industry or its regulator is unique to the securities field.  This public 
disclosure of un-adjudicated customer complaints may seem unfair to 
brokers, but securities law and regulation, more than any other area of 
law, is grounded in full disclosure.250 
In addition, because brokerage firms can enforce agreements to 
arbitrate disputes with their customers,251 but for the existence of CRD 
and the FINRA reporting rules, the public would have no access to 
information about legal proceedings brought by customers.252  The 
existence of court cases against doctors, lawyers, and accountants, for 
example, is a matter of public record.  The fact that CRD provides easy 
public Internet access to information about arbitrations filed by 
customers of brokerage firms is unique in filling a significant gap in the 
public record. 
This Article focuses on one aspect of CRD expungement—the 
process that FINRA uses to allow brokers to apply for expungement 
following settlement of an arbitration complaint.  That process is flawed.  
FINRA’s repeated and continued attempts to adapt its arbitration system 
to the problem of expungement in settled cases have failed in every 
respect. 
The issues associated with CRD expungement began in 1998 with 
the concern that arbitrators lacked the power to erase state records.253  
                                                                                                                 
2011, cases coming to closure were already declining, yet expungement applications 
were still rising. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (“Arbitration Cases Closed by Year”). 
 249. See Gilliam v. SagePoint Fin., Inc., No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949, at *5 
(FINRA July 19, 2013) (“Until FINRA substantially clarifies Rule 2080, requests for 
expungement will multiply, resulting in many expungements FINRA never intended.”). 
 250. See Exchange Act §10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); Securities Act of 1933 § 
12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2). 
 251. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 252. See About BrokerCheck Reports, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Investors/ 
ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 253. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. 
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That objection exposed many other problems—a lack of substantive 
standards and procedures and an environment in which arbitrators were 
granting expungement without making any inquiry whatsoever.254  
Aggrieved investors were being paid money to agree to the 
expungement of any records of their complaints.255  Information of 
potential value to regulators, prospective employers of brokers, and the 
investing public was thereby disappearing from CRD. 
After the moratorium was imposed in early 1999, FINRA spent 
over three years studying these issues.256  Three Notices and several 
different proposals followed.257  NASD Rule 2130 (now FINRA Rule 
2080) became effective in early 2004.258  The standards supposedly 
contained in that Rule were vague and over-lapping.259  No procedures 
were articulated, there was no requirement of a hearing, and there were 
no provisions for regulatory input or meaningful judicial review.260  
Brokers were, however, provided with a mechanism to seek 
expungement through FINRA arbitration.261 
When FINRA proposed Rule 2130, it told the SEC and its members 
that that Rule would insure that expungement—relief that was 
sometimes justified—would be granted only in extraordinary 
situations,262 but that was not to be the case.263  By 2007, it was apparent 
that the supposed articulation of the substantive standards changed 
nothing.264  The eighteen expungements granted by arbitrators to Mr. 
Karsner were particularly problematic.265  Then, the prospect of 
regulatory review and an opportunity for regulators to oppose 
expungement disappeared with the New York cases.266 
In 2008, FINRA proposed another fix to its expungement 
procedures.267  In Rule 12805, FINRA required that prior to 
                                                                                                                 
 254. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra Part I.B. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See, e.g., supra note 3. 
 263. See supra Part II.A-B. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See supra Part II.A. 
 266. See supra Part II.B. 
 267. See supra Part III.A. 
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recommending expungement, the arbitrators would have to hold a 
hearing and provide a “brief explanation of [their] reasons.”268  The Rule 
also provided that arbitrators had to consider the amount of the 
settlement before granting expungement.269  These additional safeguards 
were supposed to solve the problems. 
However, FINRA was fooling itself.  The requirement that 
arbitrators hold a hearing and make more specific findings was purely 
cosmetic.270  Despite the statement in its 2008 Rule proposal that 
complainants could object to expungement by appearing before the 
arbitrators, FINRA had to be aware that these hearings would be 
informal, ex parte, one-sided presentations of evidence271 because 
investors who have settled to, at least in part, achieve finality, appear 
very rarely.272  Arbitrators hear only the broker’s testimony273 and see 
only the documents that the broker (and the broker’s lawyer) wants them 
to see.  The fact that the amount of the settlement must be considered 
adds some friction,274 but other important items, like the broker’s 
                                                                                                                 
 268. FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805 (2013). 
 269. See id. 
 270. Now, FINRA proposes to create even more expungement procedures for ex 
parte expungements.  A rule filing is anticipated in late 2013. See Barlyn, supra note 
11; Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 11.  This new Rule, which would make it even 
easier for brokers to seek expungement, is supported by the Securities Industry 
Financial Markets Association. See Jamieson, supra note 5. 
 271. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.  The attorney or law firm that 
represented the investor was paid all that it will ever be paid for that case, and it too 
makes no appearance (even when the broker is asking the arbitrators to find that the 
investor and lawyer filed a claim that was “false”). 
 273. In some cases, the broker did not even testify and the “hearing” consisted of a 
lawyer’s presentation of evidence. See, e.g., Weiss v. Nationwide Planning Assocs., 
Inc., No. 11-01164, 2011 WL 6886309 (FINRA Dec. 21, 2011) (including one 
dissenting opinion by an arbitrator, who, on that basis, disagreed with the granting of 
expungement). 
 274. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12805(b), supra note 33.  FINRA does not provide 
statistics on the average amount of damages sought in an arbitration, the average 
amount of customer awards, or the average amount of settlements.  However, given that 
FINRA requires reporting of virtually all customer-initiated arbitrations, many 
settlements lie in a range at or slightly above the cost of defense.  Because of the 
requirement of Rule 12805(b), these complaints, which are no less likely to be valid or 
of informational value than are complaints in larger cases, are more likely to result in 
expungement than complaints in larger cases.  One unintended side effect of Rule 
12805 is that it encourages the expungement of complaints in small cases. Cf. supra 
notes 271-73 and accompanying text. (discussing, inter alia, the award in Wexco Indus. 
v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-01063, 2013 WL 653343 (FINRA Feb. 11, 2013)). 
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disciplinary history and record of prior arbitrations and expungement 
applications, are not required items. 
With no complainant or prosecutor and no rule prohibiting a 
settling firm or broker from extracting an agreement that the investor 
will not oppose the expungement,275 testimony and documents that 
might prove the truth of the customer’s allegations remain buried in 
closed files. 
FINRA’s informal, ex parte expungement hearings have proven to 
be meaningless exercises.276  No meaningful cross-examination, the 
basis of our truth-divining system, takes place in the vacuum of an ex 
parte proceeding.277  At least 73% of the studied cases involved hearings 
that were merely telephonic.  No matter how dedicated to the public 
interest an arbitrator might be and no matter how hard an arbitrator 
might try to evaluate the validity of a complaint, an ex parte arbitration 
hearing is unlikely to be anything more than a short, stylized affair. 
The requirement for arbitrators to find that the case fits within one 
of the three broad categories that FINRA established adds no 
meaningful safeguard, and arbitrator awards reflect inconsistent 
interpretations of the categories.278  Arbitrators just recite the denials that 
the broker offers during the ex parte expungement hearing.279  Indeed, in 
some cases, the arbitrators’ expungement award contains an explanation 
that the broker’s attorney drafted or was the product of a Stipulation that 
accompanied the settlement.280 
                                                                                                                 
 275. FINRA expressed concern about purchased expungements, see NASD, NTM 
01-65, supra note 3, but has never banned the practice of seeking an agreement not 
oppose expungement as part of a settlement. But see Barlyn, supra note 11. 
 276. See, e.g., York v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, No. 11-03966, 2012 WL 
4847068 (FINRA Oct. 2, 2012).  The arbitrators attached to their award a stipulation, 
signed by the parties, reciting the grounds and basis for expungement.  The award 
incorporates that stipulation word-for-word. Id. 
 277. In Gilliam v. SagePoint Financial, Inc., the arbitrator complained that ex parte 
expungement hearings require “arbitrators to play devil’s advocate to make sure the ex 
parte evidence . . . is reasonably vetted.” No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949, at *3 
(FINRA July 19, 2013). 
 278. Id. at *4–6. 
 279. See, e.g., York, 2012 WL 4847068. 
 280. See Barker v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01305, 2013 WL 595840 (FINRA Feb. 
26, 2013) 
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An especially good example of what is wrong with FINRA’s 
expungement process is Barker v. Securities America, Inc.281  In that 
case, twenty-two different brokers who were employed by Securities 
America collectively sought expungement relief.282  This single 
arbitration resulted in the expungement of thirty-one separate arbitration 
cases.283  In the expungement request, these brokers named only their 
employer as the Respondent, and the investors who made the complaints 
were not named.284  All thirty-one expungements were granted after a 
single hearing session (completed in less than four hours).285  The award 
does not indicate whether any testimony was taken from any of the 
twenty-two brokers, and it seems impossible that all twenty-two brokers 
gave sworn testimony before the arbitrator in that short time.  The award 
recites that “the parties submitted a Proposed Award for the arbitrator’s 
review.”286  The award that was entered appears likely to be the one that 
the “parties” proposed.287 
                                                                                                                 
 281. Id.; see also Hyman v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-02969, 2013 WL 2368505 
(FINRA Aug. 5, 2013) (where expungement was granted en masse for six other 
Securities Americas brokers in less than a day); see also Miller v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 
11-03509, 2013 WL 1933872 (FINRA May 1, 2013) (granting expungement of eleven 
separate arbitration complaints in a single half-day session); Stief v. Advanced Equities, 
No. 11-03116 (Apr. 27, 2013) (granting expungement in a single session for nine 
brokers); Glubiak v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01156, 2013 WL 395553 (FINRA Jan. 23, 
2013) (granting expungement of four complaints in a single half-day hearing). 
 282. See Hyman, 2013 WL 2368505 (granting expungement en masse for six other 
Securities Americas brokers in less than a day); Miller, 2013 WL 1933872 (granting 
expungement of eleven separate arbitration complaints in a single half-day session); 
Glubiak, 2013 WL 395553 (granting expungement of four complaints in a single half-
day hearing). 
 283. See cases cited supra note 283. 
 284. See id. 
 285. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 12000(n) (2013), Code Of Arbitration Procedure 
for Customer Disputes. 
 286. Barker v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01305, 2013 WL 595840 (FINRA Feb. 26, 
2013). 
 287. The State of Utah recently fined one of the brokers who received expungement 
in Barker for failing to supervise in a different case.  Eight of the brokers already had 
CRDs that showed customer complaints.  Two of these had more than one such 
complaint.  The award does not indicate whether the panel that granted these twenty-
two expungements was told any of these facts.  The hearing was telephonic.  In 
Wayman v. Securities America, Inc., by contrast, an arbitration panel awarded $1.2 
million (including punitive damages) against Securities America in a case involving 
that same investment. No. 10-00012, 2010 WL 5552424 (FINRA Dec. 12, 2013).  The 
law firm that represented the brokers in Barker represented Securities American in 
Wayman, suggesting that the arbitration proceeding in Barker was not very adversarial. 
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The requirement that arbitrators consider the amount of the 
settlement also fails to act as a meaningful safeguard.  First, many 
arbitrations involve modest amounts of damages, often not much greater 
than the cost of an expensive legal defense.  Many such (meritorious) 
complaints are undoubtedly being expunged, despite the requirement 
that the amount of the settlement be taken into account because the 
settlements can be justified by the potential cost of defense.  Even in 
larger cases, FINRA provides arbitrators with no guidance other than 
that they should take the amount of the settlement into account.288  In 
one arbitration, a $160,000 settlement—which a dissenting arbitrator 
said approximated the damages incurred by the Claimant—nevertheless 
resulted in an award of expungement.289  In another case, where $96,000 
was paid in settlement, the arbitrators explained away the amount of the 
settlement by writing that the payment to the investor was the least it 
would cost the broker to defend the allegations had a full-blown 
adversarial hearing been held.290  By contrast, the entire expungement 
hearing—in which the Respondent ostensibly proved that the claim was 
                                                                                                                 
See id.; see also Barker v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01305, 2013 WL 595840 (FINRA 
Feb. 26, 2013). 
 288. While FINRA awards recite the amount sought in the Statement of Claim, they 
rarely mention the amount of settlement. 
 289. See Lee v. Centaurus Fin., Inc., No. 11-03229, 2013 WL 1717763 (FINRA 
Apr. 8, 2013).  There, an arbitration panel granted expungement on the ground that the 
broker was not involved in a sales practice violation. See id.  The settlement agreement 
provided for a cash payment of $160,000.00 and a “covenant whereby the Claimant was 
affirmatively obligated to assist the Respondent in having the customer dispute 
information expunged . . . .” Id.  However, one arbitrator dissented, writing that the 
amount of the settlement “approximated the amount of the Respondent’s actual 
damages.” Id.  This combination of facts shows that the problem with expungement was 
not solved by either the 2008 amendment or by FINRA’s training program. 
 290. See Wexco Indus. v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-01063, 2013 WL 653343 
(FINRA Feb. 11, 2013) (following the settlement of a case that involved a net payment 
to an investor $96,000, a FINRA arbitration panel granted expungement, ruling that the 
claims made by the investor were “false”).  The arbitration award states that the panel 
heard testimony from the broker, reviewed twenty-five exhibits, and received 
respondent counsel’s explanation that the $96,000 settlement was the least it would cost 
to defend the allegations had the case not settled. See id.  One can only wonder what 
evidence the Respondent expected the Claimant to adduce that would have converted a 
three-and-a-half-hour ex parte hearing proving that the claim was “false” into a $96,000 
legal bill needed to defend an adversarial arbitration hearing. See id. 
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false—consumed only a single FINRA arbitration session.291  It was, 
after all, ex parte. 
No amount of arbitrator training can fix these flaws.  Arbitrators 
can only make decisions based on the evidence they hear.  Indeed, 
FINRA’s own training materials for arbitrators explain that an 
arbitrator’s function is to “determine the facts of the case, . . . evaluate 
the testimony and weigh to credibility of witnesses . . . .”292  The 
absence of contradictory evidence in post-settlement expungement cases 
surely explains the 93.7% expungement rate.293 
FINRA has also not fixed the issues associated with the 
confirmation requirement.  The supposed purpose of confirmation was 
to provide an additional safeguard for regulatory and public interests.294  
The New York cases, however, show that no such safeguard exists 
because the expungement award is not subject to judicial review.295  The 
Karsner decision, with its suggestion that awards styled as 
“recommendations” are not confirmable “awards,”296 looms as an issue 
that FINRA has ignored. 
There is yet another problem with the current system—one that has 
not yet appeared in the records, but that is beginning to appear in law 
offices around the country.  When an investor commences an arbitration 
proceeding, the broker’s CRD is amended to reflect the complaint.297 
                                                                                                                 
 291. See id. 
 292. See FINRA, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  BASIC ARBITRATOR TRAINING 110 (2013), 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/ 
@arbtors/documents/arbmed/p125416.pdf.  Indeed, these training materials state (in the 
context of contested proceedings) that “Affidavits are infrequently submitted in an 
evidentiary hearing for anything other than ministerial matters, like authenticating third-
party records.  If the panel, however, decides to admit an affidavit, the chairperson may 
state that its weight as evidence may be diminished, because the opposing party will not 
have a chance to challenge the truth of the statements it contains.” Id. at 99.  The same 
can be said of everything that occurs at an expungement hearing. 
 293. In Fabrizio v. Wells Fargo Advisors LLC, No. 11-02293, 2013 WL 3365259 
(FINRA June 26, 2013), an arbitrator dissented from an award recommending 
expungement, writing that the Statement of Claim “contained numerous specific 
allegations of unsuitable investments . . . . [The] dissent [does not] imply that any of the 
allegations in the Statement of Claim are true. Since the Panel was deprived of the 
opportunity to hear all of the facts through a full evidentiary hearing, there is no way to 
reach an informed conclusion on the truth or falsity of the allegations asserted.” 
 294. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 295. See supra Part II.B. 
 296. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40. 
 297. See FINRA, FORM U4 UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
REGISTRATION OR TRANSFER 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.finra.org/ 
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The arbitration claim itself is not a public document, and BrokerCheck 
does not identify the complainant.  However, an investor who then 
settles that claim may not realize that if expungement is sought and 
granted, that anonymous complaint on BrokerCheck would be erased 
and an award would be listed in the FINRA award database.  That award 
will have the investor’s name in the caption, and it is likely to contain a 
“finding” that the complaint was false or erroneous.  The name of the 
lawyer who represented that investor will also appear in that award.298 
Over time, lawyers will tire of having their names publicly 
associated with “findings” that the claims they file for their clients are 
false or erroneous.  As such awards became ubiquitous, demands by 
settling brokers that include agreements not to oppose expungement 
may begin to discourage settlements. 
In sum, no one should be surprised that expungements post-
settlement are being granted at a rate of 93.7% of the cases in which 
expungement is requested.  The conditions for such results are ripe.  
Regulators, prospective employers of brokers, and the investing public 
(and their lawyers) ought to be very concerned about this high 
expungement rate and the ease with which expungement is obtained.  
The relief that is supposed to be “extraordinary” is, in fact, virtually 
automatic.  FINRA’s reforms and supposed safeguards do not work.  
FINRA’s arbitration-based approach to post-settlement expungement 
should thus be abandoned because it cannot function properly.  A 
different system is desperately needed.  In the next section, such a 
system is proposed. 
                                                                                                                 
web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportdocs/p015111.pdf. 
 298. See, e.g., discussion supra note 290 (discussing Wexco); Cheek v. 
Barmodihardjo, No. 11-04165 (May 24, 2013).  FINRA’s procedures are already 
creating difficulty for investor and lawyers.  Even though FINRA stated in NTM 04-16 
that it considers the practice a violation of its rules, settlement offers are already being 
made conditional on a Stipulated Award for expungement or at least, an agreement to 
not to oppose expungement.  Lawyers now have to make difficult decisions about what 
to tell their clients. See NASD, NTM 04-16, supra note 119, at 214.  Both lawyers and 
clients should be concerned about either Stipulating that the complaint was false, 
agreeing to not to oppose the entry of such a finding or even without an agreement, an 
arbitral finding that the investor and lawyers filed a false complaint.  Thus, the process 
that FINRA created may, in the end, discourage the settlement of cases. 
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B.  A BETTER APPROACH 
Several changes are needed.  First, there must be a requirement that 
regulators receive notice that a broker is seeking expungement before 
the issue is decided, not after.  The notice should be given to FINRA, 
and FINRA should promptly send that notice to all state securities 
regulators to give any of them an opportunity to object right away.299 
That pre-hearing notice requirement would serve several purposes.  
First, regulators knowledgeable about the purpose of the CRD and the 
“regulatory value” of customer dispute information would be in a 
position to evaluate the import of keeping a record of a complaint versus 
expunging it.  Pre-hearing notice would give the regulators an 
opportunity to review the expungement application and check it against 
their files to see if they are already investigating the complaint.  It would 
also give the regulators an opportunity to determine whether there are 
similar complaints against the same broker by other customers.  When 
provided with notice, a regulator concerned about the expungement 
request can contact the complainant and attempt to elicit facts and obtain 
documents that will help inform the decision whether to oppose 
expungement.  In addition, the regulators can, if they wish, use their 
broad subpoena powers to obtain information from the brokerage firm or 
the broker. 
Second, the hearing procedures for obtaining these expungements 
must change.  In cases where a regulator thinks expungement is 
inappropriate, a procedure must be created that enables a regulator to 
oppose it.  Under current Rules, no such procedures exist.  FINRA’s 
Division of Expungement and the states are only notified after the 
evidence has been presented to the arbitrator/fact-finder and a decision 
was made.  Providing advance notice to FINRA enforcement and the 
states is the first step to enabling a real, rather than an illusory, 
expungement hearing. 
Third, there is no good reason for arbitrators to be the decision-
makers in post-settlement expungement situations.  Not only are 
arbitrators unable to play the role of prosecutors and adjudicators, they 
are also not equipped to serve as guardians of the public interest.  An 
arbitrator’s role is to resolve private disputes about money.  An 
administrative law judge or other adjudicatory body created under the 
                                                                                                                 
 299. Currently, FINRA sends that notice to the states only after the award is 
rendered when the case is moving to the confirmation stage. See NASD, NTM 01-65, 
supra note 3. 
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aegis of a regulator is better-suited than an arbitration panel to the task 
of evaluating the importance to the public interest in expungement than 
is an arbitration panel.  Both FINRA and the states already have units 
that can address and adjudicate expungement issues properly and can 
account for the actual regulatory interest in preserving or expunging a 
complaint.300 
Placing the decision in the hands of regulators also has additional 
benefits.  First, there would be no question about the enforceability of 
the outcome in light of Karsner.301  Second, there would be no need for 
a two-step process, such as the one that now with arbitration hearings 
followed by judicial confirmation.  Third, a broker who believes 
expungement was wrongly denied can appeal and obtain “substantial-
evidence” review,302 a procedure not available for arbitration awards.  
Finally, decisions made by regulators and courts would foster the 
development of useful legal principles, benchmarks, and guidelines.  
Right now there are none. 
Alternatively, FINRA could provide that post-settlement 
expungement requests be made directly to a court, restoring the 
moratorium for settled cases.303  A recent case from California 
demonstrates that such a system would work well.304  In Lickiss v. 
FINRA, broker Edwin Lickiss sought the expungement of seventeen 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See FINRA, GUIDE:  DISCIPLINARY HEARING PROCEDURES, available at 
https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/industry/p0067
57.pdf.  Efficiency nevertheless dictates that in cases that don’t settle, arbitrators should 
remain empowered to decide on expungement based on findings, i.e., that the claim was 
false. 
 301. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 302. FINRA’s rules provide a right to appeal an adverse decision of one of its 
Hearing Panels, and a firm or individual can appeal FINRA’s action to the SEC and 
then to a federal court. See Adjudication, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/ 
Enforcement/Adjudication/ (last visited July 16, 2013); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) 
(2012). 
 303. Cases that proceed in arbitration to an adversarial hearing should be excepted 
from the moratorium.  In such cases, the main problem with post-settlement 
proceedings (i.e., their ex parte nature) is not present. 
 304. The concept of proceeding in court and skipping arbitration is not new, and 
indeed, is contemplated (although it is discouraged) in FINRA Rule 2080(b)(2).  But 
see, Dan Jamieson, Expungement Ruling Could Have Wide Impact, INVESTMENT NEWS 
(Sep. 2, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120902/ 
REG/309029985. 
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customer complaints from the 1990s.305  Instead of proceeding in 
arbitration, the broker skipped arbitration and applied directly to a court 
for expungement.306  The broker asserted that the claims on his CRD 
were more than twenty years old, that his regulatory record since then 
has been clean, and that each of the complaints arose from a single 
investment for which the broker was paid an “ordinary commission.”307 
Lickiss’ action, which named FINRA as a defendant, sought to 
invoke the court’s general equitable powers to grant expungement.308  
FINRA opposed the application on the ground that expungement could 
only be obtained if the one of the three Rule 2080 grounds was pled and 
established.309  The lower court vacillated, but an appellate court 
eventually ruled that the FINRA Rule 2080 categories did not apply to 
the court because they were intended to be procedural rather than 
substantive.310  Instead, the court ruled that its inherent equitable powers 
had been properly invoked, and the case was remanded to the trial court 
for a hearing on whether expungement is justified.311  The court’s 
decision did not specifically define the standard for the lower court to 
apply, but it did cite the SEC’s 2003 pronouncement that expungement 
was justified when the information “lacks regulatory value.”312 
On remand, the lower court declined to grant any expungements.  
The court framed the issue in terms of the public’s right to know about 
Mr. Lickiss’s past.313  The court observed that: Mr. Lickiss was the 
                                                                                                                 
 305. See Lickiss v. FINRA, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Cal. Ct. App 2012). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 1131. 
 308. Id. at 1128. 
 309. Id. at 1134. 
 310. Id.  Rule 2080, by its terms, only states the conditions under which FINRA will 
waive notice and the requirement that FINRA be named a party in an application to 
confirm an expungement award. See FINRA MANUAL, RULE 2080(b)(1) (2013).  The 
court in Lickiss found that Rule 2080(b)’s categories do not expressly limit a court’s 
equitable power to grant expungement to FINRA’s three categories. See Lickiss, 208 
Cal. App. 4th at 1134.  The “equitable power” of courts was held to be broader than that 
defined by the three categories listed in Rule 2080. Id. 
 311. See Lickiss v. FINRA, No. N11-0457 (Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 18, 2013). 
 312. Lickiss, 208 Cal. App. 4th at 1129. 
 313. Lickiss, No. N11-0457, at 2 (quoting State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 
(Minn. 2000), a case that the appellate court in Lickiss “approvingly” cites).  The 
Lickiss court also cited a comment letter that Laurence Schultz of the Public Investors 
Arbitration Bar Association wrote when Rule 12805 was proposed in 2008. See Lickiss, 
No. N11-0457, at 3 (citing Letter from Laurence S. Schultz, President, Pub. Investors 
Arbitration Bar Ass’n, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, SEC (May 16, 2008), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2008-010/finra2008010-11.pdf).  The letter 
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subject seventeen separate arbitration claims between 1991 and 1996, 
involving approximately $1.5 million; the claims involved “serious 
allegations of egregious misconduct, including fraud; two of the cases 
went to hearing, and Lickiss lost in both; and the other fifteen cases 
settled for over $800,000.  The court wrote: 
There are strong reasons for these repeated claims of serious 
misconduct to remain part of the public record. The public interest is 
best served when investors and regulators have complete access to 
accurate info regarding the prof history of registered representatives. 
. . . [As grounds for expungement, Mr. Lickiss] points first to the age 
of the complaints . . . . While it was clear from [his] testimony that 
[his] conduct is the source of great personal shame and 
embarrassment for him, the public, brokers and regulators still have 
a real need to know that they occurred.314 
The Lickiss court’s determination, based principally on the 
regulatory value of the information and the public’s right to know, 
provides a more straightforward and appropriate approach than 
FINRA’s three-category approach in Rule 2080.315  The three categories 
that FINRA now uses (“clearly erroneous,” “not involved,” or false) are 
vague and overlapping.316  The standard for post-settlement 
expungement should be redirected toward the questions of investor 
protection and the integrity of CRD.   Indeed, FINRA Rule 2080(b)(2) 
provides: 
[U]nder extraordinary circumstances, [FINRA] may waive the 
obligation to name FINRA as a party if it determines that (A) the 
expungement relief and accompanying findings on which it is based 
are meritorious; and (B) the expungement would have no material 
adverse effect on investor protection, the integrity of the CRD 
system or regulatory requirements.317 
                                                                                                                 
describes CRD and BrokerCheck as containing information “about a broker to whom 
[investors] are considering entrusting their life’s savings. . . . The accuracy and integrity 
of the system are of utmost importance to the public.” See id. 
 314. Lickiss, No. N11-0457, at 3–4. 
 315. But see id. (noting that Lickiss did not assert that the claims against him were 
false or erroneous). 
 316. Id. 
 317. FINRA MANUAL, RULE 2080(b)(2) (2013), Obtaining an Order of 
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the Central Registration 
Depository (CRD) System. Cf. Kevin J. O’Brien, Fact Finder to European Court Backs 
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Imposition of that standard—across the board—would make the 
expungement process leaner and more logical. 
The last proposed change is to achieve the long-stated goal that 
expungement post-settlement be extraordinary.  FINRA and the states 
should provide that the burden of proof on a broker seeking 
expungement should be one of “clear and convincing evidence.”318  
Administrative law judges, hearing officers, and/or courts should 
consider whether this burden has been met and articulate the reasons for 
their decision.  Only then will expungement be the extraordinary remedy 
that FINRA intended. 
CONCLUSION 
FINRA Rules should provide that if a matter is settled prior to the 
commencement of hearings, then all applications to expunge must be 
made to FINRA’s Division of Enforcement.  FINRA would, as it does 
now in the context of the confirmation proceeding, notify the states.  
The advent of timely and meaningful notice to regulators, their direct 
involvement in post-settlement expungement requests and hearings 
before regulatory bodies rather than arbitrators, the use of a “regulatory 
value/public interest” standard, and an appropriately-high burden of 
                                                                                                                 
Google in a Spanish Privacy Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013 (citing a policy of 
Spanish Data Protection Agency to seek deletion deletions of information on the 
internet pursuant to the 1995 European Union data protection law in cases where “the 
information was ‘obsolete, lacked any relevance or public interest, and where 
widespread dissemination would lead to the harm of the applicant’”).  The Article 
reports that a recommendation has been made to the European Court of Justice that 
rejects Spain’s policy.  According to the Article, the recommendation states that “the 
1995 law ‘does not entitle a person to restrict or terminate dissemination of personal 
data that he considers to be harmful or contrary to his interests” and that the 
recommendation concluded that “wishing to eliminate embarrassing information is not 
reason enough to redact public records via Google.”). 
 318. In Gilliam v. SagePoint Financial, Inc., the arbitrator adopted just such a 
standard. No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949 (July 19, 2013).  Indeed, even as FINRA 
was amending its rules in 2008 to supposedly strengthen the expungement process, 
NASAA was advocating just such a heightened evidentiary standard in order to limit 
expungements as “an extraordinary remedy.”  Letter from Karen Tyler, supra note 210 
(“To partially address this issue, NASAA would advocate for the creation of a 
presumption against expungement.  Expungement is, and always was, intended to be an 
extraordinary remedy . . . . By creating a heightened evidentiary standard for those 
requesting expungement, expungement will in fact be an extraordinary remedy.”). 
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proof would all provide a more appropriate, efficient, and logical 
process than FINRA now employs. 
 The three interests at the intersection of the expungement 
controversy will finally be addressed.  The state regulators, whose 
interests have been virtually emasculated since 2003, will be 
reinvigorated.  The public will be assured the clean record of their 
broker or financial advisor has not been bought.  Finally, the brokers 
who settle cases will still have a place to go for a single, fair, efficient, 
and final adjudication of whether investor complaints belong on their 
CRD records. 
